

JACK C. LYONS
Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow
Glasgow, UK
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POSITIONS HELD:

University of Glasgow: Professor and Chair of Logic and Rhetoric, 2020-present
University of Arkansas: Professor, 2013-2019
Wolfson College, Cambridge: Visiting Fellow, 2017-2018
University of Arkansas: Associate Professor, 2007-2013
Rutgers University: Visiting Scholar, Spring 2008
University of Arkansas: Assistant Professor, 2001-2007
Florida State University: Visiting Assistant Professor, 1999-2001

EDUCATION:

PhD: University of Arizona, August 1999
BA: Valparaiso University, May 1993

PUBLICATIONS:

MONOGRAPH:

Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. (2009).
Oxford University Press.

TEXTBOOK:

The New Critical Thinking: An Empirically Informed Introduction. With Barry Ward (2017).
Routledge.

PAPERS:

“Two Dogmas of Empirical Justification”. (forthcoming). *Philosophical Issues*.
“Cognitive Diversity and the Contingency of Evidence”. (in prep). *Synthese*, special issue on neurodivergence.
“The Structure of Defeat: Pollock’s Evidentialism, Lackey’s Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism”, with Peter Graham. (forthcoming). In M. Simion and J. Brown, eds., *Reasons, Justification, and Defeat*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
“Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism”. (2019). *Philosophical Review* 128 (463-509).
“Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties”. (2018). In A. Bergquist and R. Cowan (eds.) *Evaluative Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
“Epistemological Problems of Perception”. (2016). *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/perception-episprob/>
“What We Talk About When We Talk About Epistemic Justification” (2016). *Inquiry* 59(7-8), 867-88.
“Unconscious Evidence”. (2016). *Philosophical Issues* 26, 243-62.

- “Goldman on Evidence and Reliability”. (2016). In H. Kornblith and B. McLaughlin, eds., *Goldman and His Critics*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- “Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception”. (2016). *Episteme* 13, 1-28.
- “Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment”. (2015). In J. Zeimbekis and A. Raftopoulos, eds., *The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- “The Epistemological Import of Morphological Content”. (2014). *Philosophical Studies* 169, 537–47.
- “Sosa on Reflective Knowledge and *Knowing Full Well*”. (2013). *Philosophical Studies* 166, 609-16.
- “Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?” (2013). *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 86, 1-40.
- “Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”. (2011). *Philosophical Issues* 21, 289–311.
- “Precis of *Perception and Basic Beliefs*”. (2011). *Philosophical Studies* 153, 443-6.
- “Response to Critics”. (2011). *Philosophical Studies* 153, 477-88.
- “Perception and Virtue Reliabilism”. (2009). *Acta Analytica* 24, 249-61.
- “Experience, Evidence, and Externalism”. (2008). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86, 461-79.
- “In Defense of Epiphenomenalism”. (2006). *Philosophical Psychology* 19, 767-94.
- “Clades, Capgras, and Perceptual Kinds”. (2005). *Philosophical Topics* 33, 185-206. (actual publication date 2007)
- “Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks”. (2005). *Philosophical Perspectives* 19, 237-56.
- “Representational Analyticity”. (2005). *Mind and Language* 20, 392-422.
- “Lesion Studies, Spared Performance, and Cognitive Systems”. (2003). *Cortex* 39, 145-7.
Reprinted in J. L Bermudez and B. Towl (eds.), *Philosophy of Psychology: Vol. II: The Organization of Mind*. Routledge. (2012).
- “General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume’s *Treatise*”. (2001). *Hume Studies* 27, 247-77.
- “Carving the Mind at its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints”. (2001). *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 52, 277-302.
Reprinted in J. L Bermudez and B. Towl (eds.), *Philosophy of Psychology: Vol. II: The Organization of Mind*. Routledge. (2012).
- “Testimony, Induction, and Folk Psychology”. (1997). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 75, 163-78.

BOOK REVIEWS:

- Review of J. L. Zalabardo, *Scepticism and Reliable Belief*. (2016). *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* 6, 412-417.
- Critical Notice of Chris Tucker, ed., *Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism*. (2015). *Analysis* 75, 153-164.
- Review of Willem A. deVries, ed., *Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars*. (2013). *Mind* 122, 274-8.

Review of Athanassios Raftopoulos, *Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform Philosophy?* (2010). *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

PRESENTATIONS:

“Two Dogmas of Empirical Justification”. University of Glasgow. April 2020.

“Four Grades of Iconicity in Perception”. Winter Workshop in Philosophy of Perception, UC San Diego. February 2020

Comments on Susanna Schellenberg, *The Unity of Perception*. Perception: Epistemology and Mind conference. University of Glasgow. October 2019.

“Hallucination and Perceptual Justification”. Perception: Epistemology and Mind conference. University of Glasgow. October 2019.

“Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism”. Analytic Philosophy Workshop, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea. July 2019.

“Social Factors and Epistemic Defeat”. Social Epistemology Network Event, Songdo, South Korea. June 2019.

Bled Philosophical Conference. June 2019.

Comments on Eric Bayruns Garcia, “Coverage-Reliance Ignorance”. Social Epistemology Network Event, Songdo, South Korea. June 2019.

Book Symposium participant: Frederique de Vignemont’s *Mind the Body: An Exploration of Bodily Awareness*. Pacific APA. April 2019

“Propositional Justification, Defeat, and Process Availability”. Southeast Epistemology Conference, Miami. October 2018.

“System 1 Thinking as Intellectual Blindsight”. Epistemology of Perception and the Perceptual Analogy Workshop. St Andrews University. June 2018.

Proposer: “This House Believes We Cannot Understand Non-Human Minds”. Cambridge Union Society, Varieties of Mind Conference. University of Cambridge. June 2018.

Comments on Haixin Dang’s “Epistemic Responsibility in Science”. Social Epistemology Network Event, Oslo. May 2018.

Comments on Chaz Firestone. Alvin Goldman retirement conference. Rutgers University. February 2018.

“Dual System Psychology and *An Empirically Informed Introduction to Critical Thinking*”, with Barry Ward. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking. Central APA, February 2018.

“Iconicity and Perceptual Representation”. University of Cambridge, February 2018. Workshop on Content and Conceptuality, University of Barcelona, May 2018.

Radboud University, May 2018.

University of Glasgow, May 2018.

“Toward a Solution to the Generality Problem for Reliabilism”. University of Glasgow, November 2017.

University of Cambridge, January 2018.

Cardiff University, April 2018.

First Flemish Epistemology Workshop, Leuven, Belgium, May 2018.

“How Can Perception Be Psychologically Inferential but Epistemically Noninferential?”
 Perception, Entitlement, and Justification Workshop, Radboud University. October 2017.

Comments on Michael Martin’s “Variation and Change in Appearance”. Kline Workshop on
 Ontology and Epistemology of Perception, University of Missouri. October 2017

“Cognitive Virtues and Meliorative Epistemology”. Bled Philosophical Conference. June 2017

“Perceptual Content” University of Antwerp. February 2017.

“Belief and Perception’s Upper Bound”. Southeastern Epistemology Conference. University of
 South Alabama, Mobile, AL. October 2016.

Top-Down Influences workshop. University of Glasgow. September 2015.

“Causal Narratives, Folk Theories, and the Epistemology of (Some) Causal Judgment”. Bled
 Epistemology Conference. Bled, Slovenia. June 2015.

Southeastern Epistemology Conference. Loyola University, New Orleans. October 2015.

Rutgers University. April 2016.

Comments on Susanna Siegel. SOFIA XX Conference. Huatulco, Mexico. January 2015.

“Internalism and Cognitive Penetration”. Perceptual Epistemology Conference. KU Leuven.
 September 2014.

University of Geneva. December 2014.

Comments on Anya Farennikova’s “Perception of Absence and Penetration from Expectation”.
 Conference on the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Psychology and Ethics. Harvard
 University. April 2014.

“Experiential Evidence?” Workshop on Perceptual Evidence. Rutgers University Camden. March
 2014.

Workshop on Epistemology of Perception. Southern Methodist University. April 2014

“Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties”. Evaluative Perception Conference.
 University of Glasgow. September 2013.

Southeastern Epistemology Conference. October 2013.

“Unconscious Evidence”. Bled Epistemology Conference. Bled, Slovenia. June 2013.

Author Meets Critics: David Henderson and Terry Horgan, *Epistemological Spectrum*.
 Participant. Pacific APA, March 2013.

“Cognitive Penetration and Other Epistemic Influence”. Symposium: The Cognitive
 Penetrability of Perception. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. February 2013.

“Cognitive Processes for Epistemologists”. Keynote, Southeast Epistemology Workshop.
 October 2012.

Midwest Epistemology Workshop. September 2012.

Author Meets Critics: Sanford Goldberg, *Relying on Others*. Participant. Pacific APA, April
 2012.

“Goldman on Evidence and Reliability”. Epistemology Workshop at the University of Arkansas.
 September 2011.

University of Pennsylvania. December 2011.

“Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?” Rutgers Epistemology Conference.
 May 2011.

Bled Epistemology Conference. Bled, Slovenia. June 2011.

“Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”. Southern Methodist University. May 2011.

“Why You Need a Brain (And Why You Don’t)”. TEDxHendrixCollege. April 2011.

“In Situ Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon”. Feldmania! conference. University of Texas, San Antonio. February 2011.

Author Meets Critics: Jack Lyons, *Perception and Basic Beliefs*: “Precis”, “Response to Goldman, Graham, and Horgan”. Pacific APA. April 2010.

Comments on Michael Roche’s “The Psycho-Neural Commitment of Inner Sense Accounts of Introspection”. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. April 2010.

“Perception and Virtue Reliabilism”. Epistemic Virtue and Value conference. Bled, Slovenia. June 2009.

Comments on Henry Jackman’s “Transparency, Responsibility, and Self Knowledge”. Southwestern Philosophical Society meeting. November, 2008. Published in *Southwest Philosophy Review* 25, 41-44.

Comments on Daniel Corbett’s “Teleology and the Swampman”. Central APA. April, 2008.

“Perceptual Kinds”. Poster presentation at Society for Philosophy and Psychology. June, 2006.

“Clades, Capgras, and Perceptual Kinds”. University of Missouri. February, 2006.

“Nonexperiential Looks”. Poster presentation at Society for Philosophy and Psychology. June, 2005.

Comments on Adam Leite’s “Reconsidering Foundationalism’s Basic Beliefs”. Central APA. April, 2005.

“Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks”. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. February, 2005.

Comments on Benjamin Cordry’s “What BIV Really Knows”. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. February, 2005.

Comments on Clyde Ragland’s “A Defense of Soft Compatibilism”. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. February, 2003.

“Nondoxastic Justification and the Brown Argument”. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. February, 2003.

Arkansas Philosophical Association. November, 2002.

“In Defense of Epiphenomenalism”. Arkansas State University. November, 2001.

“Mind-World Inference and Coherentist Accounts of Perceptual Belief”. Eastern APA. December, 2000.

“Cognitive Systems”. University of Arizona Cognitive Science Brown Bag Lecture Series. March, 1999.

“General Rules and Justificational Criteria: Hume’s Defense of Philosophy in the *Treatise*”. Hume Society meeting at Pacific APA. March, 1998.

IN PROGRESS:

“Iconicity in Perceptual Representation”
Where Perception and Cognition Meet.

DEPARTMENTAL/UNIVERSITY SERVICE:

At Arkansas:

Faculty Senate, 2019

Director of Graduate Studies, 2011–2014

Chair, Graduate Committee, 2004–2011

Departmental web site developer, 2001–2014

Scholarship Committee, 2008–2009

Personnel Committee, 2008–2009

Undergraduate advisor, 2001–2004

Member, Search Committee, 2001, 2003

Departmental library liaison (FSU), 1999–2001

Course supervisor: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (FSU), 2000–2001

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:

ORGANIZER:

Epistemology and Cognition, Sept. 2016 at College of William and Mary (co-organizer, with Chris Tucker)

Bled Philosophical Conference, 2013, 2015 (U.S. organizer)

EDITORIAL:

Editor, *Philosophical Topics* 2014—present

Review Editor, Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, *Frontiers in Psychology* 2019-2020

Associate Editor, *Episteme: A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology* 2011–2016

Co-editor (with Christoph Kelp, Ernest Sosa), special issue, *Philosophical Issues* 2016

Co-editor (with Indrek Reiland), special issue, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 2015

REFEREE:

Acta Analytica

Analysis

Analytic Philosophy

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Ergo

Erkenntnis

Faith and Philosophy

Frontiers in Perception Science

History of Philosophy Quarterly

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Journal for General Philosophy of Science

Journal of Philosophical Research

Journal of Philosophy

Logique et Analyse

Mind

Minds and Machines
Nous
Philosophers' Imprint
Philosophical Psychology
Philosophical Quarterly
Philosophical Review
Philosophical Studies
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Philosophy Compass
Synthese

McGill-Queen's University Press
MIT Press
Oxford University Press
Wadsworth Publishing

Canada Council for the Arts: Killam Program
Canadian Philosophical Association
Rutgers Epistemology Conference, Young Epistemologist Prize
Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Southwestern Philosophical Society

IMPACT AND KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE:

Content Expert on philosophy of mind for *Being* project: an educational video game under development by Tesseract Center for Immersive Environments and Game Design, at the University of Arkansas, 2018-2019.

HONORS AND GRANTS:

Cambridge Faculty Fellowship, Wolfson College, 2017-2018.
J. William Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences' Master Researcher Award for 2014-2015
Research in Teaching Grant: Flipped classroom version of critical thinking class, University of Arkansas, 2015
Honors College Curriculum Development Grant (with faculty in Music, Psychology), University of Arkansas, 2011-12
Summer Research Stipend, University of Arkansas, 2011
Interdisciplinary Course Development Grant (with faculty in Music, Psychology), University of Arkansas, 2011
Summer Research Stipend, University of Arkansas, 2005
Research Incentive Grant, University of Arkansas, 2004
Teaching Innovation Grant: Evolution and its Implications, University of Arkansas, 2004
Participant, NEH Summer Seminar, Brown University, "Thomas Reid on Perception, Knowledge, and Action", 2000

Web-Based Course Development Grant, Florida State University, 2000

Emil R. Reisen Prize: Departmental award for best graduate student paper, University of Arizona, 1997, 1998

William Fink Prize: Departmental award for outstanding graduate student, University of Arizona, 1997

COURSES TAUGHT:

GRADUATE SEMINARS:

Perception, 2018

Perception and Conception, 2015

Perception, 2010

Empiricism, Mirror Neurons, and the Representational Theory of Mind, 2008

Perceptual Experience, 2005

Epistemology: Basic Beliefs, 2002

Mental Representation, 2001

Naturalized Epistemology, 1999

DIRECTED READINGS, GRADUATE:

Naturalized Epistemology, 2003

Philosophy of Cognitive Science, 2000

GRADUATE/UNDERGRADUATE:

Theory of Knowledge, 2002–2019

Philosophy of Mind, 2003–2019

Philosophy of Psychology (cross-listed with Psychology), 2004–2019

History of Modern Philosophy, 2006

UNDERGRADUATE:

Honors Colloquium: Consciousness (cross-listed and team taught with faculty from Physics), 2019

Introduction to Cognitive Science (intro level, cross-listed with Psychology), 2014

The Darwin Course (contributor) (team taught with faculty from Education, Biology, Anthropology, History, Political Science, etc.), 2014, 2015

Honors Colloquium: Music, Language, and Thought (cross-listed and team taught with faculty from Music, Psychology), 2013

Critical Reasoning: Discovery, Deduction, and Intellectual Self-Defense, 2011-2019

Honors Colloquium: Mind, Brain, and Body (cross-listed with Psychology), 2009

Honors Colloquium: Evolution and its Implications, 2004, 2006

Introduction to Cognitive Science (upper level), 2002, 2003 (team taught with faculty from Psychology, Computer Science, Engineering)

Introduction to Philosophy, 1995, 2001–2019

Philosophy of Mind, 2000, 2001

Philosophy of Science, 2000, 2001

Knowledge and Belief, 1999, 2000
Minds, Brains, and Computers (cross-listed with Psychology), 1997, 1998, 1998
Philosophical Foundations of Western Civilization: Mind, Matter, and God, 1994, 1996
Logic and Critical Thinking, 1995, 1996

THESIS SUPERVISION:

Anthony Holdier: “Perceptual Characterization: On Perceptual Learning and Perspectival Sedimentation” (MA: 2020)
Alexandra Jewell: “An Investigation into Hybrid Models of Mindreading: A Dual Type Theory Account” (MA: 2016)
Cody Cash: “Entangled Cognition: An Examination of the State, Problems, and Possibilities of Embodied Cognition” (PhD: 2015)
Danny Marrero Avendano: "Everyone Knew He Did It, But He Was Not Condemned! Knowledge and Knowledge Attributions in Legal Contexts." (PhD: 2014)
David Barrett: “Defending the Multiple Realization Argument against the Identity Theory” (PhD: 2012)
Danny Marrero Avendano: “Cognitive Agendas and Legal Epistemology” (MA: 2011)
Bryan Cwik: “Perceptual Content, Nonconceptual Content, and Perceptual Experience” (MA: 2007)

OUTSIDE THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER:

Fergus Prien, University of Melbourne, “A Reliabilist Strategy for Solving the Problem of Induction” (MA 2020)
Mary Salvaggio, Rutgers University, “The Epistemology of Memory Beliefs” (PhD: 2018)
Ariel Cecchi, University of Geneva: “Modularity, Cognitive Penetration, and Perceptual Justification” (PhD: 2014)
Harmen Ghijzen, KU Leuven: “The Epistemic Puzzle of Perception” (PhD: 2014)