

**Jane Heal**

*Mind, Reason and Imagination.*

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*Mind, Reason and Imagination* is a collection of Jane Heal's work in the philosophy of mind and language, comprising thirteen papers published since 1986 and a new introduction. The focus is Heal's substantial contribution to one of the central debates within the philosophy mind, concerning our thoughts about the psychological states of others.

As an introduction to an area of debate, a collection of papers is no replacement for an original monograph or survey. The absence of detailed accounts of the positions of the likes of Goldman, Gordon, and Stich and Nichols is to be expected, but will not help the reader unfamiliar with the geography of the area. Connections between papers in the later sections are not always completely transparent, and do not serve to provide the thorough picture of Heal's overall position that one would expect from an original book-length work. Nevertheless, there is much to recommend this collection. Heal is an engaging writer, and the papers are accessible and lucid. In the absence of a new, systematic treatment of the area, this is the next best thing.

Three interrelated issues are discussed. First, there is the method employed in making judgements about the psychological states of others. The need for an adequate account of the possession of psychological concepts is the second topic, which sees the emphasis shift towards the philosophy of language. Finally, there is the wider issue of the nature of the subjects who make the judgements and of whom such judgements are made.

The first of these issues is the central concern of the papers in the first two sections of the book, which serve to introduce the theory theory / simulation theory debate. Included here is Heal's 'Replication and Functionalism', one of the starting points for the resurgence of interest in this area.

The debate between theory theory and simulation theory concerns the ways in which we arrive at judgements about the psychological states of others, whether about the explanation of past behavior or the prediction of future behavior. According to the theory theory, when making such judgements we employ (tacitly or explicitly) some psychological theory. Functionalism provides Heal with an example of the theory theory; here psychological concepts are given a causal-explanatory gloss, and reasoning about others' psychological states proceeds in terms of causal relations. Psychological thinking becomes a form of 'natural scientific thinking' (5), and psychology, construed in an appropriately scientific way, slots comfortably into the broader reductionist scientific program.

The simulation theory denies that we possess such theoretical knowledge. Instead, when we reflect on the beliefs, desires, etc., of another subject, 'it is appropriate to seek to understand such animate creatures "from the inside"

' (28). Wondering about how another will act should certain circumstances arise involves attempting to 'simulate' or re-create her thought processes. Crucial to this is the ability to reason hypothetically. This allows one to imaginatively re-create another's train of thought even when her starting point is rejected.

The initial formulations of the simulationist approach (a term Heal is now reluctant to use) are rich and suggestive, if (understandably) lacking full development. Much of the discussion in later papers attempts to flesh out the underlying idea and to address certain crucial misunderstandings. Foremost amongst these is the mistaken belief that simulating the thought processes of another is merely a heuristic tool that can be fruitfully employed in the absence of a fully worked out psychological theory. To take this line is to treat the simulationist thesis as an empirical suggestion about the mechanisms involved in psychological judgement, one that does not impinge on the wider issue of the psychological nature of persons.

Such an understanding can be found in much of the other literature, notably in the writings of Stich and Nichols. On this approach, simulation theory is taken as claiming that when we engage in psychological reasoning we take our inference mechanisms 'off-line', detaching them from the belief-forming and action-guiding mechanisms they would normally feed into.

Heal is at pains to distance herself from such a model (see especially Essay 6). On her account, the alternative to the theory theory should not be conceived of as an empirical hypothesis; rather, the claim is that 'it is an a priori truth that simulation ... must be given a substantial role in our personal level account of psychological understanding' (91-2). To avoid ambiguity, the term 'co-cognition' is introduced for this latter suggestion. Two people co-cognise when they run through the same process of reasoning, whether hypothetically or otherwise. Reasoning about others' psychological processes in a crucial range of cases thus essentially involves co-cognising with them.

This approach crucially involves assumptions about the degree to which another is rational, in that one cannot draw any inferences about the beliefs another will arrive at when faced with certain evidence unless she is taken to be generally rational (see Essay 8). There are also implications for our account of psychological concepts, explored in the papers in the third and fourth sections.

Underlying the discussion of the two approaches to psychological judgement is a deeper concern for the way in which we should conceive of the subjects of such psychological judgements. This takes us from the first aforementioned issue to the third. Heal rejects the suggestion that we should think of persons in the same way as we think of the rest of the physical world. The appropriate way of conceiving of an individual's psychological processes is to see them as reflective of her world-view; it is not to think of them as realizing a sophisticated causal system, describable in much the same way as the rest of physical reality. Yet thinking of them in this latter way is just what the theory theory requires of us. This difference also finds expression

in the forms of thought emphasized by each approach. The co-cognition approach stresses the role of first person thought, whereas the theory theory approach is resolutely third person. First person authority is correspondingly a central theme in the final section of the collection.

The collection of these papers in one place is to be welcomed. It is marred only slightly by the absence of two relevant and important papers from 1994 and 1995. Including these might have increased repetition, as Heal suggests, but in a collection of articles, rather than a monograph or introductory text, this need be no bad thing.

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