

Antidumping: What are the Numbers?

Maurizio Zanardi*
University of Glasgow

October 2002

Abstract

While tariff barriers decreased worldwide, antidumping has surged to play a crucial role as the most important non-tariff barrier. The literature provides various “numbers” on the use of antidumping. This paper improves upon the existing studies in two directions. First, since theory shows that antidumping laws can have an effect even when investigations are not carried out, data on the time pattern of worldwide implementations of antidumping laws are presented. This time profile shows peculiar relationships with some legal developments in GATT and WTO dispositions. Second, data on the use of antidumping from GATT/WTO sources are corrected of some mistakes and complemented with various other sources. This allows to cover important countries like China, Taiwan, Russia and Ukraine, which are usually excluded since they are not members of the WTO, as well as countries that began using antidumping in the last few years. From this enlarged and updated dataset it appears that the role of new users of antidumping is even more important than what was previously considered.

Keywords: Antidumping; GATT; WTO

JEL classification: F13; K33

*The author would like to thank the various antidumping authorities that replied to inquiries on the use of antidumping in their countries, and seminar participants to the ETSG Conference in Kiel for their comments. Financial support from the John Robertson Bequest Fund of the University of Glasgow is gratefully acknowledged.

Contact information: Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Building, Glasgow G12 8RT, UK. E-mail: m.zanardi@socsci.gla.ac.uk

1 Introduction

The various rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now World Trade Organization (WTO), have consistently decreased tariff barriers worldwide. However, and perhaps as a counterbalancing effect, non-tariff barriers have grown over time. Among these, antidumping (AD) has surged to play a crucial role as the most important non-tariff barrier. Originally devised as a remedy to the unfair practice of dumping, it is nowadays widely recognized as a successful form of protectionism that basically lost any connection with dumping as “all but AD’s staunchest supporters agree that AD has nothing to do with keeping trade “fair.” ... It is simply another form of protection.” (Blonigen and Prusa, forthcoming).

Antidumping is a debated topic both among economists and legal scholars. The literature on the effects of AD is long both in its theoretical and empirical dimensions and it constitutes a well-rounded and self-contained body of research. At the risk of simplification, the theoretical analysis reaches the conclusion that there are very few instances where AD is supported by sound economic motives. Given that the empirical occurrence of these cases is very rare, the general presumption is that AD is nowadays used to the advantage of industrial interests with negative impacts on consumers’ welfare and competition. However, the results of this analysis do not seem to reach policy makers, whose majority is in favor of AD. Indeed, one of the most important results of the empirical literature on AD is that the estimated collective net cost of AD and countervailing duty orders (a less frequently used law which offsets export subsidies) was around \$4 billion/year for the US in 1993 (Galloway et al., 1999); an amount larger than the cost of any US trade restraint policy with the exception of the Multifiber Arrangement. This and other similar studies (see U.S. International Trade Commission, 1995) show that the imposition of AD duties results in a gain in producers’ welfare that is smaller than the consumers’ loss. Therefore, the general consensus on AD is that the more the worse or, at least, the more worrying for economy-wide welfare concerns.

Given the concern for the welfare implications of AD, many studies provide various “numbers” on the use of AD. The common assessment is made by considering the number

of cases initiated by various countries per year, together with an analysis of the outcome of these petitions (i.e., successful versus unsuccessful petitions). The main source for these data is the GATT/WTO since member countries are required to communicate a summary of their decisions with regard to AD cases. Unfortunately, not all the countries fulfil this requirement and even when they do, their reports sometimes contain mistakes. A more fundamental problem with this source of data is that, by definition, it does not cover countries that are not members of the WTO. This implies that recent heavy users of AD like China, Taiwan, Russia and Ukraine, which are important in terms of trade volumes, are completely ignored.¹

For the reasons discussed above, this paper constructs a new and improved dataset that addresses all three issues. First, obvious mistakes and inconsistencies in the GATT and WTO reports have been corrected. Second, missing data for countries members of the GATT/WTO have been obtained using information provided by the national authorities of various countries through direct contact or through their publications. One notable example is the case of the European Community that until June 1991 only reported to the GATT its AD cases initiated against “Parties to the [GATT AD] Agreement”, therefore excluding numerous cases. Finally, information on AD petitions initiated by non-WTO countries has been collected. This extensive data work results in a dataset much more comprehensive than those usually employed so far in the literature.

The main conclusion from this enlarged and updated dataset is that the role of the new users of AD is even more important than previously thought. For example, the data by Miranda et al. (1998) for the period 1987-1997 already show the increasing importance of the new users of AD. However, it seems that after 1997 their role is a lot more prominent than the picture up to 1997 would suggest.

The data provided in this paper also explore another dimension of AD. In particular, with the emphasis on the filing of AD petitions, little attention is usually paid to world-wide implementations of AD laws. In other words, which countries have an AD law and when did they adopt them? These questions are relevant since the theoretical literature

¹China joined the WTO in December 2001 and Taiwan in January 2002. The data discussed in this paper refer to a period ending in June 2001.

on AD shows that the existence of an AD law can have significant trade effects. For example, the threat of AD can be a powerful way to support collusive behavior among domestic and foreign firms. Therefore, not only statistics on petitions should be analyzed when assessing the relevance of AD, especially if the use of AD exhibits a long delay from the implementation of the AD law.

In order to shed light on this issue, this paper presents and discusses data on the time pattern of worldwide implementations of AD laws. To my knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study that investigates this dimension of the AD process. The results of this analysis are twofold. First, many more countries than expected have an AD law. Some of them have such laws since a long time ago but many never actually used them. Secondly, the time profile that emerges is rather peculiar and suggests a possible explanation for the widespread adoption of AD laws. In fact, some legal developments in GATT and WTO dispositions correlate with peaks in implementations.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next Section presents a short review of some key theoretical and empirical results to be compared with the statistics presented. Section 3 presents and discusses the data on the worldwide implementation of AD laws while Section 4 exposes the updated and enlarged dataset on AD cases. Conclusions follow in Section 5.

2 A Short Literature Review

Many theoretical models address the issue of the strategic behavior of firms once an AD law is implemented. The aim of this Section is to provide a short survey of the most important theoretical and empirical results that are directly related to the analysis that follows.²

A well-established result of the theoretical literature is that an AD law can have pervasive effects even when no duties are levied or a petition is not initiated. For example, Prusa (1994) considers the firms' price strategies in a two-period duopoly model

²See Niels (2000) and Blonigen and Prusa (forthcoming) for a comprehensive review of the literature on dumping and AD.

and shows that the mere existence of an AD law changes the nature of the competition between the domestic and foreign firm. In particular, the AD law creates a price floor for the foreign firm, as lower prices could be subject to AD actions. By imposing a lower bound on the import price, the AD law facilitates collusion so that both firms gain when an AD law is in place. Focusing instead on quantity competition, Staiger and Wolak (1989, 1992) show that AD petitions can serve as credible threats that lead to more successful collusion in infinitely repeated games between a foreign monopolist and a domestic industry (either a monopoly or perfectly competitive). When demand is low, AD petitions are able to prevent the foreign monopolist from dumping its excess capacity on the domestic market. Since the threat is credible, it does not have to be implemented (i.e., petitions are withdrawn) and therefore duties are never actually imposed. Moreover, when the domestic market is competitive, the filing behavior makes the foreign monopolist reduce its capacity so that lower levels of imports obtain even when petitions are not filed since demand is not low.

Duties are not the only outcome when a petition is successful. In some cases, price undertakings or voluntary export restraints (VERs) are negotiated between the domestic and foreign industry. In these cases, exporters agree to a minimum price or maximum amount of exports. These settlements can induce other forms of strategic interactions. Indeed, Anderson (1992) shows that they create an incentive for firms to dump even more. When petitions result in VERs, exporters are allocated with export licenses based on firms' historical foreign market shares. Then, forward-looking exporters have an incentive to enlarge their market shares by dumping more at present and thus securing larger profits under the export restraint.

From an empirical perspective, the already mentioned studies by Gallaway et al. (1999) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (1995) emphasize the (static) welfare costs associated with the use of the AD law in US. These estimates, although very large, are to be taken as lower bounds of the actual effects of AD since they are only based on cases ending up with duties and the above discussion has shown other effects of AD laws. On the other hand, it is difficult to quantify the non-duty effects of AD as they can arise in various ways and be indistinguishable from other economic factors. In this

regard, Staiger and Wolak (1994) analyze the US AD activity for the period 1980-1985 and find evidence of “substantial trade restrictions” while an investigation takes place and for cases resolved by formal undertakings. Moreover, some firms file petitions only with the objective to capture the trade restricting investigation effects.

This short literature review shows that it would be too simplistic to describe the AD phenomenon only in terms of the number of petitions filed. A broader approach should be preferred, which is what this paper aims to do by considering the worldwide implementation of AD laws and their use distinguishing between cases filed and their outcome (i.e., duties and undertakings).

3 Antidumping Laws in the World

The existing literature pays little attention to the time pattern of AD law adoptions. Usually the only references relate to the countries that first introduced such laws or, at the other extreme, to the very last additions to the long list of countries with AD provisions in their legal codes. At times these references are incorrect too. Focusing the attention only on AD initiations and their outcomes can be misleading. For a case can be initiated only if an AD law exists, but the existence of the law does not necessarily imply that petitions are filed.³ Moreover, the theoretical contributions presented in the previous Section show that the existence of an AD law can have trade effects. This is the more interesting as various countries started to use the laws a long time after their implementation.

If the surge of interest in (anti)dumping is a relatively recent phenomenon, the evidence of dumping activities goes back to the late nineteenth century as reported by Viner (1923) in the first summa of dumping with a chapter on “The prevalence of dumping prior to 1890”. Instead, the history of AD starts at the beginning of the twentieth century, with Canada being the first country to adopt an AD legislation in 1904, followed by Australia in 1906 and several other nations in the years up to 1920.⁴ Canada and

³Poland admitted 24 AD petitions in 1992, even if an AD law was not implemented until 1997, by invoking the customs law.

⁴Finger (1993) and others interpret this first wave of AD legislation referring to a general hostility

Australia, together with the European Union, New Zealand and the United States, are considered the “traditional users” of AD.⁵ However, South Africa should not be forgotten as it implemented an AD law in 1914 and it was very active up to the 1960s, as the GATT (1958) reports that South Africa had imposed 22 of the 36 AD decrees in force in 1958.

This first wave of AD law implementations was followed by a surprisingly quiet period of about 30 years. Beginning in the 1950s, however, AD starts to acquire a worldwide status, with more and more countries adopting AD laws at an increasing pace, only interrupted in the 1970s, that reaches a total of 94 countries having an AD law by the end of 2001.^{6,7}

Table 1 provides the exact dates for the implementation of AD laws in each country for which information is available, but probably Figure 1 gives a better idea of the phenomenon. A steep upward trend is clearly detectable from the mid 1950s with an acceleration in the last decade. Still, the number of countries with AD laws only gives a partial picture. Figure 2 places these numbers in a geographical context and it shows that, in the last decade, most of the activity in introducing AD legislation has been in developing countries. Much of this is catch-up, as most of the industrialized world already had AD laws prior to 1990. The increased adoption of AD laws worldwide means that more than 90% of worldwide imports in 2001 were potentially subject to AD actions, while in 1990 the comparable figure was around 71%.⁸

Postponing the discussion of possible explanations for these numbers to the next Section, some comments are nonetheless necessary. Table 1 shows that some of the countries usually considered among the “new users” of AD had an AD law in their legal codes for long time. South Africa, South Korea and Argentina are just some examples

toward Germany which, towards the end of World War I, had a huge production surplus ready to be dumped, and the general climate of trust-busting in the political debate. However, Viner in 1923 noticed that this belief may be the result of “the wartime plague of mendacious propaganda.”

⁵The United States implemented the AD law in 1916 and New Zealand in 1921. The common AD law for the European Community entered into force in 1968.

⁶The fifteen countries member of the European Union are counted individually.

⁷Armenia introduced its AD law in 2002. The analysis in the paper refers to the end of 2001 because the time lag in the dissemination of this kind of information makes it possible that more countries adopted an AD law in 2002 even if such information is not available.

⁸Intra-EU trade is excluded from these figures as AD does not apply among member countries.

where the active use of the law lags its implementation. However, the list of countries that never used their AD law is even longer, as it will be discussed further in Section 4.1. Many developing countries feature in this list raising the concern that possible financial limitations are probably the main obstacle for even more AD activity. Therefore, as these countries will move along the path of trade liberalization and growth, a potentially substantial increase in AD cases can be expected since the tools are already in place.

The total tally of countries presented in Table 1 is not very different from the information reported by official WTO documents for member countries (WTO, 2001). However, these documents do not always report the date of implementation; analogously, the country specific documents are not always conclusive on the year of adoption of the law either. Yet, by looking at the WTO documents it is surprising that many countries have not reported to the WTO if they have an AD law. In fact, the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and it makes it compulsory for all country members to report this information. This requirement is clearly not binding and it does not seem that the WTO tries hard to enforce it as the AD authorities of some countries that have not notified their status to the WTO replied within days to the inquires they received for compiling the data of this paper.

As a final comment, it is striking that there is no empirical study that tries to quantify the aggregate effects of AD laws on trade flows given the large number of countries with an AD law and the literature about the possible effects of such laws even when duties are not imposed. Clearly, such an attempt would not be easy because of the difficult task of capturing possible trade effects when no duties are levied and petitions are not filed. Distinguishing the role of AD from other trade policies would also be a complicating issue. Still, it seems that this is a research direction that should receive more attention in view of the ever increasing adoption and use of AD laws.

3.1 Some possible explanations

Various explanations have been proposed to explain the surge in AD activity. Among these, the hypothesis of AD as a pressure valve to sustain further trade liberalization finds support also outside the academic world. This is clearly evident in the following

quote from a recent communication of the US to the WTO (1998):

“... antidumping laws administered in strict conformity with the Antidumping Agreement actually assist governments in their efforts to continue trade-liberalizing measures by providing relief to domestic industries injured by foreign firms that engage in unfair trade practices, even as international trade liberalizes. From this perspective, the antidumping rules are a critical factor in obtaining and sustaining necessary public support for the shared multilateral goal of trade liberalization.”⁹

The hypothesis is consistent with Figure 1, which shows that the number of countries with an AD law is strongly correlated with the number of countries members of the GATT/WTO. Even if there is no formal requirement for a member country to adopt any AD legislation, it seems that the two aspects are interrelated. On the other hand, the IMF and the World Bank have, in the past, included the enactment or drafting of AD legislation as a condition for the release of loans.¹⁰

But the hypothesis of AD as a pressure valve is not fully able to explain the scenario outlined by Figures 1 and 4. In fact, many countries had AD laws on their books for many years but did not use them until recently. Bureaucratic limitations certainly make a reasonable explanation for some countries, but a retaliatory motive is another worrying possibility. Indeed, some countries have gone as far as including a reference to the latter possibility in their law. For example, article 56 of the new Chinese law that entered into force on January 1st, 2002 states that “Where a country (region) discriminatorily imposes anti-dumping measures on the exports from the People’s Republic of China, China may, on the basis of the actual situations, take corresponding measures against that country (region).” A formal test of this motive is provided by Prusa and Skeath (2001) who find some support for a retaliation motive for both traditional and new users

⁹In the very same document, the US goes even further in stating that AD is “necessary to the maintenance of the multilateral trading system.”

¹⁰The World Bank offered technical and legal advice to many countries (see Krishna, 1997). Still, some economists within the World Bank openly disagreed with this position (Finger, 1992). The IMF approved a credit for Pakistan in 2000 subject to the enactment of a new AD law.

of AD, while excluding an increase in unfair practice as an explanation of the increased use of AD.

If AD as either a pressure valve or retaliation go to a great length in explaining the surge of initiations, the time pattern of implementation of AD laws in Figure 1 also suggests a legal element to complement these explanations. Once the GATT entered into force, the first wave of implementations took place in the late 1950s, coinciding with the decision of the contracting parties to the GATT to have a “systematic study” of AD legislation (see GATT, 1958). The first Antidumping Code was negotiated during the Kennedy Round and entered into force in 1967, with five countries then implementing an AD law in 1968 and a couple more following shortly thereafter. The Tokyo Round Code dates to 1980 and again Figure 1 shows an increase in implementations in the 1980s after a period of inaction. On January 1st, 1995 the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code entered into force and represented a major leap forward. Apart from the new rules that it includes, this code is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and, as such, it applies to all members whereas previous codes had to be signed by each GATT member.¹¹ This requirement may explain the steep slope in Figure 1 in the second half of the 1990s as member countries feel the pressure to have regulations consistent with the WTO AD Code, although there is no formal requirement for member countries to have an AD law. On the other hand, the WTO requirements may be able to limit the protectionist bias in some countries’ legal dispositions by standardizing AD laws. Nonetheless, it is likely that the temptation to (mis)use an AD law is strong once a country implements it.

Whether the causation runs from the legal requirements to the implementation and use of AD laws, or vice versa, cannot be said with the data available. However, it is reasonable to conclude that legal aspects, trade liberalization, and retaliatory motives are part of the same (vicious) circle that surrounds the use of AD.

¹¹For example, the US never signed the Kennedy Round Code.

4 Antidumping Cases in the World

The tables in this Section describe the use of AD laws in the period 1981-2001 using a newly constructed dataset. This dataset improves over the existing studies in various ways. First, it updates the analysis to the most recent period for which all WTO countries filed their annual reports. Second, various mistakes and inconsistencies in the GATT/WTO reports have been corrected by double-checking the original documents submitted to the WTO and publications from the AD authorities. Similarly, information provided by AD authorities either from their publications or through direct contact has been used to complement these documents when countries did not submit their summary statistics. More importantly, similar sources of information have also been employed to document the AD activity of countries not members of the WTO.¹²

Following the convention used by the GATT/WTO, the definition of year refers to the period covering July 1st to June 30th of the following year so that, for example, 1981 includes the AD activity undertaken in the period July 1st 1980-June 30th 1981. This is a fairly common feature in the studies on AD data even though not many authors explicitly acknowledge the specific time span, giving rise to possible misleading conclusions. An exception in this regard is the work by Miranda et al. (1998), which reports data on a calendar basis since they have direct access to the WTO AD measures database, not publicly available to outside researchers.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that the statistics presented in the tables to follow refer to the number of investigations without any adjustment made to take into account the trade volumes of the countries involved. Therefore, these numbers may overlook the importance of some specific cases; in the same way, comparisons across countries may underestimate the actual significance of the figures. Various studies have addressed this aspect by constructing indexes of relative use and target of AD (see Finger et al., 2001; James, 1999; and Miranda et al., 1998). This paper does not tackle this issue as its main focus is to update and complement the typical sources of data on AD. Still, it may be interesting to see if the conclusions reached by these kind of studies are

¹²See the Appendix for a detailed description of the data sources.

valid for the enlarged dataset presented in this paper.

4.1 Cases Initiated by Reporting Country

Table 2 reports the number of AD investigations initiated in the period 1981-2001 broken down by investigating country. All the countries with at least one observation are included. The available data show that a total of 4597 investigations were initiated in the period 1981-2001. This number should be taken as a lower bound since the various dots in the table represent missing data and some countries are not included because no information is available. However, the total of 4598 of AD petitions should not be far from the truth since it is obvious from the table that most of the missing numbers refer to small countries or countries that have initiated very few petitions for other years, with the exception of Argentina and South Africa. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain detailed data to eliminate these gaps. In comparison to Table 1, 13 countries are completely excluded (i.e., Albania, Antigua Barbuda, Belarus, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Kazakhstan, Malawi, Moldova, Nigeria, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Uganda) since no information is available. However, with the exception of Portugal these countries present very small trade volumes and their contribution to the use of AD is probably very limited or nil, otherwise some information should have been discovered during the extensive search for data.^{13,14}

Miranda et al. (1998) report 2196 cases for the period 1987-1997, which is less than half of the cases documented in Table 2, while the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2001) accounts for 3900 cases worldwide from July 1979 to December 1999. It is not easy to compare these figures because of the different periods. However, restricting Table 2 to 1987-2001 in order to match a starting point similar to Miranda et al. (1998) yields a total of 3451 cases versus 2196, which implies a 57% increase when considering four years more than Miranda et al. (1998). Indeed, the totals by year in Table 2 show that the recent years explain the large grand total.

¹³Portugal joined the EEC in 1986 and therefore only 5 observations are missing.

¹⁴Miranda et al. (1998, footnote 4) mention a long list of countries that notified no initiations to the WTO. This information is not included in the tables as it was not possible to confirm it with the information reported by GATT/WTO publications.

The distribution of users is heavily concentrated since the four largest users in 1981-2001 (i.e., Australia, Canada, EEC, and USA) each have a double-digit share and file together 64.10% of all AD petitions. However, the scenario is quite different if the focus is restricted to the recent years (i.e., 1995-2001) since in this case only the seven largest users together reach a share higher than 64%. Among these large users, there are quite a few new entries as Argentina, India and South Africa have larger shares than Australia and Canada. Indeed, the role played by the new users is the most important feature of the AD phenomenon when analyzed over a long span of time, as it will appear from the discussion that follows.

Independently from the specific numbers, the qualitative picture emerging from Table 2 is not completely different from what is already known from previous studies. It does not come as a surprise that only very few countries initiated investigations in the early 1980s. In this period, the five traditional users (i.e., Australia, Canada, EEC, New Zealand, and USA) account for almost all the cases, the remaining being investigated in turn by Austria, Finland, Japan, Spain and Sweden. However, over the twenty-one years under scrutiny, a total of 45 countries initiated AD investigations. Miranda et al. (1998) document the activity of 29 countries for the period 1987-1997 while the CBO (2001) reports 37 active countries up to December 1999. A comparison of these results and a look at Table 2 shows that most of the new users became active in the last few years.

Equally interesting, even if not explicitly discussed in the literature, is the number of countries that never initiated an investigation even if they had an AD law. Table 2 reports 27 countries in such a position and if the countries with no information are added because of the very likely presumption of no action, a total of 40 countries were in a position to initiate AD cases but never did. This figure is almost as large as the number of active users. The volumes of trade of the countries in the two groups are clearly different but still this comparison hints to the possibility of even more AD activity in the near future.

Most of the new users became active in the last few years and this paper improves upon the existing studies on this aspect in two directions. First, it considers countries

that are not members of the WTO. Secondly, it includes countries that started to use AD only very recently.

On the first aspect, the experiences of Taiwan, China, Russia and Ukraine are worth discussing especially because they are mostly ignored in the literature.¹⁵ Taiwan implemented an AD law in 1984 and since then it has initiated 73 cases. It ranks twelfth in terms of total initiations just after New Zealand (85 cases) and higher than South Korea (66 cases). In this sense, Taiwan is a case in point to the fact that ignoring non-WTO countries can induce misleading conclusions. China, Russia and Ukraine share a somewhat similar experience as they implemented an AD fairly recently and they started to use it quite heavily from the very beginning. In only four years since introducing the law, China initiated 22 cases and “[a]ccording to foreign diplomatic sources, some 75 additional applications are awaiting action.” (Ross and Levine, 2001). As reported in Table 2, Russia and Ukraine only investigated three cases between 2000 and 2001 but they each started four cases in 2002. Most of them involve steel products and are targeted to each other in what seems a retaliatory scheme that may escalate in more actions.

On the second aspect, there are many relatively small countries that started to use AD recently. From Table 2, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Lithuania, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Poland, Thailand and Trinidad Tobago are just the last additions to the list of active countries. An interesting feature for most of these examples is that they started to use the AD law right after its implementation. However, there is a set of countries that recently added an AD to their legal codes but never applied it: Bulgaria, Croatia, El Salvador, Fiji, Latvia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Morocco, the Slovak Republic, Tunisia, Uzbekistan fall in this category.¹⁶ One possible explanation may lie in the legal terms of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code, as described in Section 3.1. The fact that it applies to all WTO member countries may have pushed the adoption of AD laws purely to respect a legal requirement. Once in place, these laws may be dormant in some countries because of no real need for such a protectionist instrument,

¹⁵Kempton et al. (1999) very briefly discuss the situation of Taiwan, China, and Russia.

¹⁶It is likely that the same holds for most of the countries that have recently implemented an AD law and for which no information is available.

poor administrative systems and/or shortage of staff. On the other hand, some other countries may have been prompted to make use of this tool sooner than they would have done otherwise.

In conclusion, many new countries are now using AD. The last row of Table 2 confirms the increasing importance of these users with a share above 50% for all but one of the years from 1995 onwards.¹⁷ The forecast made by Miranda et al. (1998, page 8) with data up to 1997 is confirmed by the updated data: “It seems likely, however, that the share of the new users in the total number of investigations will contract in the immediate future. This is because the number of cases launched in recent years by the traditional users was at an historic low.” Still, the absolute number of investigations by new users does not seem to decrease, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 provides more insight by depicting the number of cases filed each year. In particular, in the top panel it appears that the number of AD investigations is characterized by business cycles type of fluctuations as well as by a statistically significant increasing trend. However, the bottom panel reveals that the positive trend is determined by the increasing number of petitions filed by the new users while cases by the traditional countries are on average constant over time, if not decreasing. This observation, together with the large number of countries that could potentially begin to use their AD law, points to the likely possibility of an increasing use of AD in the years to come.

4.2 Affected Countries

The aggregate statistics for the countries affected by AD petitions are reported in Table 3 while Table 4 details the number of investigations by affected country and by year.¹⁸ Over the period 1981-2001 a total of 113 countries have been the target of AD investigations, although this number is partly inflated by the breakup of former Socialist countries and the re-unification of Germany. Nonetheless, the number of countries

¹⁷The drop to 48.96% in 2001 is due to the surge of investigations in US (i.e., 77 in 2001 versus 17 in 2000).

¹⁸The statistics for affected countries do not sum up to the grand total in Table 2 because in some cases the receiver of an AD petition is not known.

has been increasing over time as shown in Table 3 when splitting the whole sample in subperiods: 68 in 1981-1987, 83 in 1988-1994 and 93 in 1995-2001.

When considering the whole sample, Asian countries dominate: China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Thailand occupy some of the top places and together represent the target of 29.86% of all petitions. United States, Brazil and some European countries fill up the remaining positions in the top ten. Still, the distribution of cases is less concentrated for affected countries than for users of AD. As mentioned in the previous Section, the top four users of AD together account for 64.10% of all cases while the top four affected countries are subject to not even half of that share of investigations (30.33%).

The picture that emerges from the full period of twenty-one years hides some interesting patterns. In fact, the ranking of countries changes quite considerably across the three subsamples for the top ten most investigated countries. The position of China, Taiwan and South Korea moves considerably upward over time: China is the most investigated country in the period 1995-2001 and across the whole sample but it was ranked only sixth in 1981-1987 with less than half of cases with respect to Japan, which was the top country during that period. This is probably explained by the increasing export activities of these countries although Table 4 shows a large variation in the cases against each country in each following year. This observation is consistent with the sensitivity of AD activity to business cycle fluctuations, as shown by Knetter and Prusa (2000).

An analysis of investigating versus affected countries by subperiods also illustrates changing patterns in the use of AD. The four panels in Table 5 tabulate the number of cases for reporting versus targeted countries distinguishing by level of development. In order to allow comparisons with the analogous statistics reported by Miranda et al. (1998), this paper uses their same definitions of ‘developed’, ‘developing’, and ‘country in transition’ (see Appendix for details). Panel A reports the results for the whole 1981-2001 period. As for Table 3, the scenario that appears in this way conceals important changes that occurred over time. For example, it would appear that developed countries mostly target other developed countries (42%) but this is true only in the years 1981-1987. Starting in 1988, the share of petitions from developed to developed countries

decreases substantially, as developed countries investigate more and more developing countries and economies in transition. Indeed, in the most recent subperiod 44.43% of the petitions from developed countries are aimed to developing countries and 25.08% to countries in transition.

The wave of new users clearly appears in Table 5 as the share of investigations from developing countries and economies in transition together goes from 1.27% in 1981-1987 to 48.15% in 1995-2001. With regard to these users, in the most recent period they mostly targeted countries in the same category while before they were mainly aiming to developed countries. Instead, countries in transition basically make their appearance among AD users only in the latest subperiod, given that the 24 investigations in 1988-1994 were all initiated by Poland using the customs law since an AD law was implemented only in 1997.

Miranda et al. (1998) present a table for the years 1987-1997 analogous to Table 5. When comparing it with the four panels just discussed, it emerges that their statistics mostly match Panel C, which refer to 1988-1994. This is not surprising given the very similar periods under analysis. However, it implies that stopping in 1997 leaves out the interesting changes in patterns that emerge when looking at Panel D. In this sense, the four years that this paper adds to the sample used by Miranda et al. (1998) are crucial in order to capture the ever increasing importance of the new users.

Table 6 presents the breakdown of who is investigating who. From the very last row, it appears that most investigating countries have a large set of targets, as the average of affected countries is 17 and there are ten countries that initiated AD cases against more than 20 countries. Traditional users lead in this ranking with the US having targeted 72 countries over the full sample followed by the EEC, Canada and Australia with 68, 56 and 50 countries respectively. However, new users feature predominantly in this list with Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Korea filing cases against 40, 53, 38, 38 and 45 countries respectively. From the last column in Table 6, it appears that the most investigated country, in terms of other countries filing AD cases, is South Korea, followed by China, Russia, Germany, Japan and the US.

4.3 Outcome of Investigations and Measures in Force

The fact that an AD investigation is initiated does not necessarily imply that duties will be imposed. The literature review in Section 2 shows that trade effects can be induced by the mere existence of an AD law. However, it is important to look at the actual outcome of the investigations.

An affirmative conclusion for an AD investigation does not necessarily translate into duties, as undertakings are another possible result. In this case, foreign producers agree on the minimum price they have to charge for their exports or on the maximum amount of exports. Table 7 reports the number of investigations initiated and measures imposed by reporting country ranked by the success rate (i.e., percentage of measures imposed out of total cases) of their investigations. The first and last countries exhibit success rates at the two extremes because of the few cases initiated over the sample period. Not considering these economies, the EEC leads with 73.72% of cases resulting in some form of affirmative outcome. Surprisingly, the other traditional users are much lower in the ranking: only 59.35% of US cases end up with measures imposed and Australia is the lowest of the traditional users with a success rate of 41.01%.¹⁹ On the other hand, some of the new users feature predominantly in the upper part of the list: India, South Korea and Mexico are all on or above a 65% success rate. Again, the detailed breakdown reported in Table 8 shows a sort of business cycle fluctuation in the imposition of definitive measures by each country analogous to the pattern in the initiation of AD cases in Table 4.

The last column of Table 7 shows an extreme dispersion in the share of imposed measures accounted by price undertakings. The EEC and South Korea clearly favor this form of settlement as they account respectively for 40.66% and 39.53% of all measures. Instead, undertakings amount to only 4.92% of the cases in US, even if there is some evidence that withdrawn petitions, which are quite numerous in US, are a signal of private settlements between the domestic and foreign industry (Zanardi, 2000). The case of Japan is peculiar. Although Japan adopted an AD law as early as in 1920, it

¹⁹Canada and New Zealand have success rates of 58.37% and 48.24% respectively.

seldom used it and when it did use it, most cases were settled with undertakings in the form of voluntary export restraints. Yoshimatsu (2001) interprets these facts on the basis that “the antidumping system is unfamiliar in Japanese society, a non-litigious society, in which the people prefer to settle conflict ‘out of court’ ”. A non-belligerent approach in AD can explain why some countries heavily rely on price undertakings but it is unlikely that this can fully explain the huge variance observable in the last column of Table 7. It seems that more research is needed on this aspect not only focusing on the experiences of the US and the EEC.

Considering the number of measures in force by year reported in Table 9, Figure 4 shows a steadily overall increase over time although with differences among countries at different levels of development. In particular, measures from developing countries are increasing more quickly as these users are still “learning” the mechanics of this protectionist tool and more and more countries join the group. Countries in transition only started to impose measures in 1999 and it will be interesting to see if in the next few years they will follow the pattern of developing countries that similarly started with very few cases but soon began to apply increasing numbers of measures. On the other hand, developed countries impose a more stable, although increasing, number of cases as they have been using this tool for a longer period.

Tables 10 to 13 describe the distribution of definitive measures in greater details.²⁰ A breakdown of the countries imposing measures versus affected country by level of development is presented in Table 10. Comments very similar to Table 5 apply to Table 10 as well. In particular, the aggregate picture from the period 1981-2001 hides important changes in the pattern of measures imposed. Without repeating the same observations, the general conclusion to draw from looking at the various subsamples is the increasing importance of developing countries and economies in transition as more recent periods are analyzed. However, when only price undertakings are considered (Table 11) developed countries mainly use this form of measures with economies in transition, developing countries mostly reach such agreements with developed countries

²⁰The statistics by group of countries do not sum up to the grand total in Table 7 because in some cases the country against which measures are imposed is not known.

while nothing can be said about economies in transition since they settled only one price undertaking in the whole period. Interestingly, this description is valid across the different periods.

Table 12 reports the definitive measures in place by year and by affected country. Judging from the percentages in the last columns, it seems that there is less variation in ranking of the most affected countries with respect to what can be observed just for the initiations of AD cases (i.e., Table 3). For example, China, Japan, South Korea and the US are constantly the top four investigated countries independently of the period considered. However, consistent with the statistics reported above, the number of affected countries increases as more recent subperiods are considered.

The complete breakdown of who imposed measures against who is provided in Table 13. A comparison with the cases initiated indicates once again that many petitions do not lead to any measure as only 89 countries have had final measures imposed even if AD cases were initiated against 113 countries. Similarly, 38 countries imposed duties and undertakings against 45 countries that filed AD petitions. The discrepancies in these comparisons are in part due to the countries that very recently initiated to use their AD laws, as they may not have reached yet the final stage of the investigations. However, 55.94% as the percentage of successful cases indicates that many petitions are not well founded but that, at the same time, filers of AD cases seem to find it optimal to allege dumping even when it does not occur.

5 Conclusions

The empirical relevance of AD has increased over the last decade as many new countries joined the so-called “traditional users” (i.e., Australia, Canada, EEC, New Zealand, and US) in making heavy use of this protectionist tool. This wave of AD activity has stimulated many theoretical contributions even though the actual dimension of the phenomenon is an empirical issue. For this reason, statistics on the use of AD abound in the literature. Nonetheless, important aspects of AD are usually ignored, possibly biasing the overall picture of the phenomenon.

This paper improves upon the existing literature on the use of AD in two dimensions. First, it presents the first comprehensive dataset on the time profile of implementations of AD laws around the world. Although this issue is completely neglected in the empirical studies, theory shows that the existence of AD laws can have non-secondary trade effects. Moreover, the fact that many countries did not yet use their AD law hints to the possibility of increasing volumes of AD cases in the near future as these countries overcome the initial difficulties in the application of the law and pursue further trade liberalization. The time profile of implementations also suggests a peculiar relationship between some legal developments in GATT and WTO dispositions and peaks in adoptions of AD laws.

Secondly, updated data on the use of AD are presented with a particular emphasis on the new users. In this regard, countries not members of the WTO are generally excluded by the statistics on AD but this implies that important countries, in terms of trade volumes, are not taken into account. For example, Taiwan has been very active on this front since the late 1980s and more recently China, Russia and Ukraine have filed an increasing number of petitions right after implementing an AD law. Figures for these countries are therefore relevant. Moreover, not including these countries in the analysis may result in underestimating the possibility of retaliatory behavior in AD actions, as these economies are at the top of the list of affected countries. The updated dataset presented in this paper also covers more countries than similar studies do since data from GATT/WTO reports have been complemented with information directly gathered from AD authorities.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the enlarged and updated dataset on the use of AD is that the role of the new users has become more and more important in the last decade or so. In particular, these countries have been particularly active in the last few years so that the picture from data up to 1997 presented by Miranda et al. (1998) has already changed. In this sense, it would be partly misleading not to take into account the very recent years and the large number of (WTO and non-WTO) countries active on AD.

A Appendix

The following sources have been used in constructing the database:

1. GATT reports from 1979 to 1994 (GATT, various years) and WTO reports (WTO, various years) from 1995 to 2001.
2. Publications, annual reports, and documents published by AD authorities.
3. The AD authorities of the following countries provided information through direct contact: Albania, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Mauritius, Morocco, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey.
4. The following publications: Brink (2002), CBO (2001), GATT (1958), Salvatore (1992), Santos (1998), Van Bael and Bellis (1996).

Following Miranda et al. (1998), the following categories of countries are used in the paper:

Developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Developing countries: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Macao, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Suriname, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Island, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Countries in transition: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, USSR, Yugoslavia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

References

- [1] Anderson, J. E. (1992): “Domino Dumping I: Competitive Exporters”, *American Economic Review* 82, 65-83.
- [2] Blonigen, B. A., Prusa, T. J. (forthcoming): “Antidumping”, in Harrigan, J. editor: *Handbook of International Trade*. Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- [3] Brink, G. (2002): *Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Investigations in South Africa: A Practitioner’s Guide to the Practice and Procedures of the Board on Tariffs and Trade*. Gosh Trading, Pretoria.
- [4] Congressional Budget Office (2001): “Antidumping Action in the United States and Around the World: an Update”, *CBO Paper*. Washington DC.
- [5] Finger, J. M. (1992): “Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping? Never”, *World Bank Outreach No. 1*. Reprinted in Finger, J. M, editor (2002): *Institutions and Trade Policy*, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA.
- [6] Finger, J. M. (1993): *Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- [7] Finger, J. M., Ng, F., Wangchuk, S. (2001): “Antidumping as Safeguard Policy”, *World Bank Working Paper No. 2730*.
- [8] Gallaway, M. C., Blonigen, B. A., Flynn, J. E. (1999): “Welfare Costs of the U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws”, *Journal of International Economics* 49, 211-244.
- [9] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1958): *Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties*. Geneva, GATT/1958-2.
- [10] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (various years): *Basic Instruments and Selected Documents. Supplements 25-40*. Geneva.

- [11] James, W. E. (1999): “The Rise of Antidumping: Does Regionalism Promote Administered Protection?”, *International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development Working Paper*.
- [12] Kempton, J., Holmes, P., Stevenson, C. (1999): “Globalisation of Anti-Dumping and the EU”, *SEI Working Paper No. 32*.
- [13] Knetter, M. M., Prusa, T. J. (2000): “Macroeconomic Factors and Anti-Dumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries”, *NBER Working Paper 8010*.
- [14] Krishna, R. (1997): “Antidumping in Law and Practice”, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1823*.
- [15] Miranda, J., Torres, R. A., Ruiz, M. (1998): “The International Use of Antidumping: 1987-1997”, *Journal of World Trade* 32, 5-71.
- [16] Niels, G. (2000): “What is Antidumping Policy Really About?”, *Journal of Economic Surveys* 14, 467-492.
- [17] Prusa, T. J. (1994): “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Law”, *Journal of Economic Integration* 9, 260-289.
- [18] Prusa, T. J., Skeath, S. (2001): “The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings”, *NBER Working Paper 8424*.
- [19] Ross, L., Ning, S. (2001): “Perfecting Protectionist Procedures: An Update on China’s Antidumping Regulations”, *The China Business Review*, May-June 2001.
- [20] Salvatore, D., editor (1992): *National Trade Policies*. Handbook of Comparative Economic Policies, volume 2. New York; London: Greenwood Press.
- [21] Santos, L. E., editor (1998): *The Compendium of Foreign Trade Remedy Laws*. American Bar Association.
- [22] Staiger, R. W., Wolak, F. A. (1989): “Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion”, *NBER Working Paper 3016*.

- [23] Staiger, R. W., Wolak, F. A. (1992): “The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly”, *Journal of International Economics* 32, 265-287.
- [24] Staiger, R. W., Wolak, F. A. (1994): “Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States”, *Brookings Papers on Microeconomics*, 51-118.
- [25] U.S. International Trade Commission (1995): *The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements*. Investigation No. 332-344. Publication 2900. Washington DC.
- [26] Van Bael, I., Bellis, J. F. (1996): *Anti-Dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws of the EC*. Bicester: CCH Europe.
- [27] Viner, J. (1923): *Dumping: a Problem in International Trade*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- [28] World Trade Organization (1998): *Communication from the US*. Document WT/WGTCP/W/88. Geneva.
- [29] World Trade Organization (2001): *Report of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices*. Document G/L/495. Geneva.
- [30] World Trade Organization (various years): *Report of the Committee On Anti-Dumping Practices*. Documents G/L/... and *Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices - Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of the Agreement* for various countries. Documents G/ADP/N/... Geneva.
- [31] Yoshimatsu, H. (2001): “The Political Economy of Antidumping in Japan”, *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* 6, 22-46.
- [32] Zanardi, M. (2000): “Antidumping Law as a Collusive Device”, *Boston College Working Paper No. 487*.

Table 1: Year of implementation of AD law by country

Country	Year	Country	Year	Country	Year
Canada	1904	Ireland	1968	Honduras	1995
Australia	1906	Austria	1971	Indonesia	1995
South Africa	1914	Argentina	1972	Nicaragua	1995
United States	1916	Uruguay	1980	Costa Rica	1996
Japan	1920	Spain	1982	Guatemala	1996
New Zealand	1921	Pakistan	1983	Panama	1996
France	1921	Taiwan	1984	Paraguay	1996
United Kingdom	1921	India	1985	China	1997
Germany	1951	Singapore	1985	Czech Rep.	1997
Greece	1954	Chile	1986	Morocco	1997
Norway	1954	Mexico	1986	Poland	1997
Malawi	1955	Brazil	1987	Slovak Rep.	1997
Zambia	1955	Iceland	1987	Uzbekistan	1997
Zimbabwe	1955	Turkey	1989	Cameroon	1998
Cyprus	1956	Colombia	1990	Egypt	1998
Nigeria	1958	Cuba	1990	Fiji	1998
Finland	1958	Ecuador	1991	Kyrgyzstan	1998
Antigua Barbuda	1959	Israel	1991	Lithuania	1998
Barbados	1959	Peru	1991	Kazakhstan	1998
Jamaica	1959	Bolivia	1992	Russia	1998
Malaysia	1959	Romania	1992	Albania	1999
Uganda	1959	Trinidad Tobago	1992	Belarus	1999
Dominica	1960	Venezuela	1992	Croatia	1999
Grenada	1960	Bulgaria	1993	Ukraine	1999
South Korea	1963	Slovenia	1993	Latvia	2000
Saint Lucia	1964	Hungary	1994	Moldova	2000
Portugal	1966	Philippines	1994	Saudi Arabia	2000
Belgium*	1968	Senegal	1994	Dominican Rep.	2001
Italy*	1968	Thailand	1994	Armenia	2002
Luxembourg*	1968	Tunisia	1994		
Netherlands*	1968	El Salvador	1995		

Notes: No dates available for Bangladesh, Denmark, Kenya and Sweden.

A * means that the country implemented the law as a result of the common EEC law.

Sources: WTO (2001) and direct contact with AD authorities.

Table 2: AD investigations initiated, 1981-2001

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	
Argentina	30	14	7	42	18	8	15	23	44	201	4.37	
Australia	60	54	71	70	63	54	40	20	19	23	46	76	61	45	6	8	22	35	18	18	20	829	18.03	
Austria	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	EEC							9	0.20	
Barbados	0	0	0	0	.	.		0	0.00
Bolivia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Brazil	0	4	2	0	2	11	9	30	13	1	19	12	13	17	10	143	3.11	
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Canada	29	64	34	26	35	27	24	20	14	15	12	16	38	22	9	6	8	10	17	11	41	478	10.40	
Chile	1	2	4	2	2	2	1	1	4	17	0.37
China	1	1	5	4	1	2	1	2	3	3	12	22	0.48	
Colombia	1	1	5	4	1	2	1	2	6	3	1	27	0.59	
Costa Rica	1		1	4	0	1	0	0	6	0.13	
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Cuba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	.	.	0	0	0.00
Czech Rep.	0	0	0	2	1	0	3	0.07	
Dominica	0	0	0	0	.	.	0	0	0.00
Ecuador	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.02
EEC	33	54	49	42	57	32	30	43	43	34	22	23	33	47	37	16	26	44	41	49	29	784	17.05	
Egypt	0	0	2	5	13	4	1	25	0.54
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	0	0.00
Fiji	0	0	0	0	0	.	.	0	0.00
Finland	2	0	0	1	0	0	5	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	EEC					.	16	0.35		
Grenada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Honduras	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.02
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
India	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Indonesia	3	1	11	3	24	43	38	27	37	192	4.18	
Israel	0	9	11	0	12	1	33	0.72	
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	.	.	3	4	7	5	3	1	2	25	0.54	
Japan	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.02	
Japan	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	0.22	
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	0	0.00
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	11	3	14	0.30
Malaysia	2	0	2	8	2	1	0	15	0.33	
Mexico	3	12	12	11	13	25	24	23	18	3	5	8	12	7	4	180	3.92	
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
New Zealand	.	1	0	0	1	1	6	4	8	0	6	13	4	2	9	9	1	5	4	6	5	85	1.85	

Table 2: AD investigations initiated, 1981-2001, continued

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	
Nicaragua															0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	3	0.07
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Panama															0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0.04
Paraguay															0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	0.04
Peru												2	2	7	4	4	3	5	5	4	4	0	36	0.78
Philippines											24				7	0	2	1	3	4	2	19	19	0.41
Poland*												0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	28	0.61	
Romania												0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Russia**															0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	0.04
Saint Lucia															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Senegal															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Singapore					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0.04
Slovak Rep.															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Slovenia															0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.02
South Africa													30	17	20	44	11	39	34	15	20	230	5.00	
South Korea						3	1	0	0	3	2	0	7	4	3	6	18	5	5	4	5	66	1.44	
Spain	0	0	0	1	0	EEC																1	0.02	
Sweden	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	4	2	1	0	0	EEC							13	0.28	
Taiwan					2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	9	17	3	0	4	9	8	6	0	73	1.59	
Thailand														3	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	7	0.15	
Trinidad Tobago															0	0	1	1	5	0	1	8	0.17	
Tunisia															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Turkey									12	20	10	6	6	26	2	0	5	0	7	0	6	94	2.04	
Uganda															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Ukraine**															0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3	0.07	
Uruguay															0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0.07	
USA	15	50	40	46	61	63	41	31	25	24	52	62	69	47	30	15	20	28	43	17	77	856	18.62	
Uzbekistan															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Venezuela												0	5	1	1	5	0	7	10	0	2	31	0.67	
Zambia															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Zimbabwe															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Total	140	225	195	188	219	185	153	141	129	128	205	254	339	312	190	174	215	299	320	250	336	4597		
% Over Total	3.05	4.89	4.24	4.09	4.76	4.02	3.33	3.07	2.81	2.78	4.46	5.53	7.37	6.79	4.13	3.79	4.68	6.50	6.96	5.44	7.31	100.00		
% New Users	2.14	0.89	0.51	2.13	0.91	4.32	7.84	16.31	15.50	25.00	32.68	25.20	39.53	47.76	52.11	68.97	64.19	59.20	61.56	59.60	48.81	34.04		

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not have an AD law in that year.

A dot means that no information is available for that year.

EEC means that the country joined the EEC in that year; from that year onward its investigations are included in the EEC data.

* Poland initiated investigations in 1992 invoking the customs law, as the AD was implemented only in 1997.

** These numbers should be viewed as minimum cases initiated since they have been obtained from citations in the popular press.

Table 3: Countries affected by AD investigations

Country	1981-2001		Country	1981-1987		Country	1988-1994		Country	1995-2001	
China	422	9.43%	Japan	105	8.88%	China	137	9.08%	China	236	13.23%
USA	338	7.55%	USA	103	8.71%	USA	134	8.89%	South Korea	137	7.68%
South Korea	305	6.82%	Germany	72	6.09%	South Korea	107	7.10%	USA	101	5.66%
Japan	292	6.53%	South Korea	61	5.16%	Japan	103	6.83%	Japan	84	4.71%
Taiwan	201	4.49%	Brazil	50	4.23%	Brazil	75	4.97%	Taiwan	84	4.71%
Germany	190	4.25%	China	49	4.15%	Taiwan	69	4.58%	Russia	70	3.92%
Brazil	188	4.20%	Italy	48	4.06%	Germany	52	3.45%	Indonesia	68	3.81%
United Kingdom	118	2.64%	Taiwan	48	4.06%	Thailand	40	2.65%	India	67	3.76%
Thailand	116	2.59%	France	45	3.81%	France	39	2.59%	Germany	66	3.70%
France	115	2.57%	United Kingdom	44	3.72%	India	37	2.45%	Thailand	64	3.59%
Italy	113	2.53%	Spain	43	3.64%	United Kingdom	35	2.32%	Brazil	63	3.53%
India	108	2.41%	Czechoslovakia	41	3.47%	Hong Kong	32	2.12%	Ukraine	48	2.69%
Spain	100	2.24%	East Germany	32	2.71%	Italy	31	2.06%	United Kingdom	39	2.19%
Indonesia	92	2.06%	Canada	31	2.62%	Belgium	28	1.86%	Spain	35	1.96%
Russia	92	2.06%	Poland	31	2.62%	Romania	27	1.79%	Italy	34	1.91%
Poland	75	1.68%	Belgium	28	2.37%	Canada	26	1.72%	Malaysia	33	1.85%
Canada	74	1.65%	Yugoslavia	28	2.37%	Malaysia	26	1.72%	South Africa	33	1.85%
Romania	71	1.59%	Romania	26	2.20%	Indonesia	23	1.53%	France	31	1.74%
Belgium	69	1.54%	USSR	24	2.03%	Singapore	23	1.53%	Mexico	27	1.51%
Malaysia	65	1.45%	Hungary	20	1.69%	Poland	22	1.46%		25	1.40%
South Africa	62	1.39%	Sweden	19	1.61%	Russia	22	1.46%	Netherlands	23	1.29%
Ukraine	62	1.39%	New Zealand	17	1.44%	Spain	22	1.46%	Poland	22	1.23%
Mexico	60	1.34%	Netherlands	15	1.27%	Turkey	22	1.46%	Hong Kong	19	1.07%
Czechoslovakia	59	1.32%	Mexico	14	1.18%	Netherlands	21	1.39%	EEC	18	1.01%
Hong Kong	59	1.32%	South Africa	13	1.10%	Yugoslavia	19	1.26%	Romania	18	1.01%
Netherlands	59	1.32%	Singapore	12	1.02%	Mexico	19	1.26%	Canada	17	0.95%
Turkey	55	1.23%	Thailand	12	1.02%	Czechoslovakia	18	1.19%	Chile	17	0.95%
Singapore	48	1.07%	Austria	11	0.93%	Venezuela	18	1.19%	Kazakhstan	15	0.84%
Yugoslavia	47	1.05%	Venezuela	11	0.93%	Argentina	16	1.06%	Czech Rep.	14	0.78%
Hungary	43	0.96%	Argentina	10	0.85%	South Africa	16	1.06%	Argentina	13	0.73%
Argentina	39	0.87%	Hong Kong	8	0.68%	Ukraine	14	0.93%	Australia	13	0.73%
Sweden	39	0.87%	Israel	8	0.68%	Austria	13	0.86%	Belgium	13	0.73%
Venezuela	39	0.87%	Luxembourg	8	0.68%	Hungary	13	0.86%	Singapore	13	0.73%
East Germany	38	0.85%	Turkey	8	0.68%	USSR	11	0.73%	Austria	12	0.67%
Austria	36	0.80%	Norway	7	0.59%	Pakistan	11	0.73%	Belarus	12	0.67%
USSR	35	0.78%	Portugal	7	0.59%	Sweden	11	0.73%	Hungary	10	0.56%
EEC	28	0.63%	Switzerland	7	0.59%	Australia	10	0.66%	Venezuela	10	0.56%
Australia	26	0.58%	Finland	6	0.51%	EEC	10	0.66%	Latvia	9	0.50%
New Zealand	26	0.58%	Malaysia	6	0.51%	Finland	10	0.66%	Sweden	9	0.50%
Chile	25	0.56%	Bulgaria	5	0.42%	Denmark	8	0.53%	Bulgaria	8	0.45%
Finland	22	0.49%	India	4	0.34%	Israel	8	0.53%	Slovak Rep.	8	0.45%
Czech Rep.	21	0.47%	Ireland	4	0.34%	Bulgaria	7	0.46%	Egypt	7	0.39%
Israel	21	0.47%	Philippines	4	0.34%	Colombia	7	0.46%	Lithuania	7	0.39%
Bulgaria	20	0.45%	Australia	3	0.25%	Czech Rep.	7	0.46%	Pakistan	7	0.39%
Kazakhstan	20	0.45%	Chile	3	0.25%	Egypt	6	0.40%	Saudi Arabia	7	0.39%
Pakistan	18	0.40%	Colombia	3	0.25%	East Germany	6	0.40%	Denmark	6	0.34%
Belarus	17	0.38%	Trinidad Tobago	3	0.25%	Ireland	6	0.40%	Finland	6	0.34%
Denmark	15	0.34%	Iceland	2	0.17%	Belarus	5	0.33%	Iran	6	0.34%
Portugal	15	0.34%	Puerto Rico	2	0.17%	Chile	5	0.33%	Macedonia	6	0.34%
Egypt	14	0.31%	Qatar	2	0.17%	Kazakhstan	5	0.33%	Israel	5	0.28%
Luxembourg	14	0.31%	Saudi Arabia	2	0.17%	Norway	5	0.33%	New Zealand	5	0.28%
Norway	14	0.31%	Algeria	1	0.08%	Philippines	5	0.33%	Serbia/Monten.	5	0.28%
Saudi Arabia	14	0.31%	Costa Rica	1	0.08%	Saudi Arabia	5	0.33%	Croatia	4	0.22%
Colombia	13	0.29%	Denmark	1	0.08%	Greece	4	0.27%	Greece	4	0.22%
Ireland	13	0.29%	Dominican Rep.	1	0.08%	Luxembourg	4	0.27%	Portugal	4	0.22%
Slovak Rep.	12	0.25%	Ecuador	1	0.08%	New Zealand	4	0.27%	Switzerland	4	0.22%
Switzerland	12	0.27%	Egypt	1	0.08%	Portugal	4	0.27%	Colombia	3	0.17%

Table 3: Countries affected by AD investigations, continued

Country	1981-2001		Country	1981-1987		Country	1988-1994		Country	1995-2001	
Philippines	11	0.25%	El Salvador	1	0.08%	Slovak Rep.	4	0.27%	Costa Rica	3	0.17%
Lithuania	10	0.22%	Greece	1	0.08%	Uzbekistan	4	0.27%	Estonia	3	0.17%
Greece	9	0.20%	Indonesia	1	0.08%	Georgia	3	0.20%	Ireland	3	0.17%
Latvia	9	0.20%	Iran	1	0.08%	Lithuania	3	0.20%	Moldova	3	0.17%
Iran	7	0.16%	Kenya	1	0.08%	Bangladesh	2	0.13%	Peru	3	0.17%
Serbia/Monten.	7	0.16%	Kuwait	1	0.08%	Cote d Ivoire	2	0.13%	United Arab Em.	3	0.17%
Trinidad Tobago	7	0.16%	Libya	1	0.08%	Croatia	2	0.13%	Uzbekistan	3	0.17%
Uzbekistan	7	0.16%	Peru	1	0.08%	Moldova	2	0.13%	Vietnam	3	0.17%
Croatia	6	0.13%	Suriname	1	0.08%	Serbia/Monten.	2	0.13%	Cuba	2	0.11%
Macedonia	6	0.13%	Virgin Island	1	0.08%	Sri Lanka	2	0.13%	Luxembourg	2	0.11%
Moldova	5	0.11%	Zimbabwe	1	0.08%	Tajikistan	2	0.13%	Norway	2	0.11%
Costa Rica	4	0.09%			Trinidad Tobago	2	0.13%	Philippines	2	0.11%	
Estonia	4	0.09%			Turkmenistan	2	0.13%	Slovenia	2	0.11%	
Georgia	4	0.09%			Albania	1	0.07%	Trinidad Tobago	2	0.11%	
Peru	4	0.09%			Armenia	1	0.07%	Uruguay	2	0.11%	
Bangladesh	3	0.07%			Azerbaijan	1	0.07%	Zimbabwe	2	0.11%	
Cuba	3	0.07%			Cuba	1	0.07%	Algeria	1	0.06%	
Tajikistan	3	0.07%			Cyprus	1	0.07%	Armenia	1	0.06%	
Turkmenistan	3	0.07%			Estonia	1	0.07%	Azerbaijan	1	0.06%	
United Arab Em.	3	0.07%			Kyrgyzstan	1	0.07%	Bahrain	1	0.06%	
Uruguay	3	0.07%			Macao	1	0.07%	Bangladesh	1	0.06%	
Vietnam	3	0.07%			Papua New G.	1	0.07%	Bolivia	1	0.06%	
Zimbabwe	3	0.07%			Paraguay	1	0.07%	Bosnia-Herzegov.	1	0.06%	
Algeria	2	0.04%			Switzerland	1	0.07%	Georgia	1	0.06%	
Armenia	2	0.04%			Tunisia	1	0.07%	Guatemala	1	0.06%	
Azerbaijan	2	0.04%			Uruguay	1	0.07%	Guatemala	1	0.06%	
Cote d Ivoire	2	0.04%						Honduras	1	0.06%	
Iceland	2	0.04%						Kyrgyzstan	1	0.06%	
Kyrgyzstan	2	0.04%						Libya	1	0.06%	
Libya	2	0.04%						Liechtenstein	1	0.06%	
Macao	2	0.04%						Macao	1	0.06%	
Paraguay	2	0.04%						Malawi	1	0.06%	
Puerto Rico	2	0.04%						Mozambique	1	0.06%	
Qatar	2	0.04%						Nicaragua	1	0.06%	
Slovenia	2	0.04%						Paraguay	1	0.06%	
Sri Lanka	2	0.04%						Tajikistan	1	0.06%	
Albania	1	0.02%						Turkmenistan	1	0.06%	
Bahrain	1	0.02%									
Bolivia	1	0.02%									
Bosnia-Herzegov.	1	0.02%									
Cyprus	1	0.02%									
Dominican Rep.	1	0.02%									
Ecuador	1	0.02%									
El Salvador	1	0.02%									
Guatemala	1	0.02%									
Honduras	1	0.02%									
Kenya	1	0.02%									
Kuwait	1	0.02%									
Liechtenstein	1	0.02%									
Malawi	1	0.02%									
Mozambique	1	0.02%									
Nicaragua	1	0.02%									
Papua New G.	1	0.02%									
Suriname	1	0.02%									
Tunisia	1	0.02%									
Virgin Island	1	0.02%									
TOTAL	4474		TOTAL	1182		TOTAL	1508		TOTAL	1784	

Notes: EEC represents cases brought against the European Community as a whole.

Table 4: Countries affected by AD investigations by year, continued

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	9	0.20	0.08	0.27	0.22
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.06
Honduras	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.06
Hong Kong	1	1	0	2	3	1	0	6	6	2	3	4	7	4	5	4	1	4	2	2	1	59	1.32	0.68	2.12	1.07
Hungary	3	5	2	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	1	1	0	2	1	2	4	1	0	43	0.96	1.69	0.86	0.56
Iceland	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.04	0.17	0.00	0.00
India	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	7	7	9	9	3	6	9	14	10	11	14	108	2.41	0.34	2.45	3.76
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	5	4	9	9	4	5	10	11	16	13	92	2.06	0.08	1.53	3.81
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	0.16	0.08	0.00	0.34
Ireland	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	13	0.29	0.34	0.40	0.17
Israel	0	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	2	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	1	21	0.47	0.68	0.53	0.28
Italy	2	12	6	11	6	8	3	3	2	1	6	6	8	5	7	3	5	6	4	1	8	113	2.53	4.06	2.06	1.91
Japan	4	9	22	17	21	14	18	25	14	8	17	13	15	11	9	8	8	15	21	11	12	292	6.53	8.88	6.83	4.71
Kazakhstan																						20	0.45	0.00	0.33	0.84
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.08	0.00	0.00
Kuwait	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.08	0.00	0.00
Kyrgyzstan																						2	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.06
Latvia																						9	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.50
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.04	0.08	0.00	0.06
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.06
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	10	0.22	0.00	0.20	0.39
Luxembourg	1	6	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	14	0.31	0.68	0.27	0.11
Macao	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.06
Macedonia																						6	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.34
Malawi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.06
Malaysia	2	1	0	0	1	0	2	5	2	0	1	4	5	9	3	2	4	3	5	4	9	65	1.45	0.51	1.72	1.85
Mexico	0	0	1	2	3	3	5	0	1	3	3	5	5	2	4	6	2	2	7	3	3	60	1.34	1.18	1.26	1.51
Moldova																						5	0.11	0.00	0.13	0.17
Mozambique	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.06
Netherlands	2	5	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	6	6	3	1	7	2	5	4	0	4	59	1.32	1.27	1.39	1.29
New Zealand	0	0	4	6	4	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	26	0.58	1.44	0.27	0.28
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.06
Norway	0	0	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	14	0.31	0.59	0.33	0.11
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	7	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	18	0.40	0.00	0.73	0.39
Papua New G.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.00
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.06
Peru	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	0.09	0.08	0.00	0.17
Philippines	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0.25	0.34	0.33	0.11

Table 4: Countries affected by AD investigations by year, continued

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%
Poland	2	4	1	4	11	4	5	3	4	2	4	0	5	4	1	1	5	5	1	4	5	75	1.68	2.62	1.46	1.23
Portugal	0	2	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	15	0.34	0.59	0.27	0.22
Puerto Rico	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.04	0.17	0.00	0.00
Qatar	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.04	0.17	0.00	0.00
Romania	0	8	5	1	5	5	2	4	3	5	6	3	4	2	1	0	2	3	5	1	6	71	1.59	2.20	1.79	1.01
Russia	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	5	15	7	0	9	12	19	15	8	92	2.06	0.00	1.46	3.92
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	1	3	1	1	14	0.31	0.17	0.33	0.39
Serbia/Monten.	3	1	0	1	2	2	3	3	1	0	4	5	2	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	7	0.16	0.00	0.13	0.28
Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	1.07	1.02	1.53	0.73
Slovak Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0.27	0.00	0.27	0.45
Slovenia	0	0	4	3	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.11
South Africa	1	6	13	7	16	12	6	12	13	10	12	20	23	17	14	7	12	25	31	24	24	62	1.39	1.10	1.06	1.85
South Korea	3	5	5	16	8	2	4	2	0	1	6	3	4	6	2	5	5	9	4	5	5	305	6.82	5.16	7.10	7.68
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.04	0.00	0.13	1.96
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.08	0.00	0.00
Suriname	1	1	4	5	3	3	2	1	3	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	3	4	0	1	0	39	0.87	1.61	0.73	0.50
Sweden	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	12	0.27	0.59	0.07	0.22
Switzerland	1	3	8	3	11	13	9	6	10	9	9	16	10	9	7	4	11	14	15	13	20	201	4.49	4.06	4.58	4.71
Taiwan	0	0	0	5	5	1	1	4	2	3	4	6	9	12	8	4	8	4	13	13	14	3	0.07	0.00	0.13	0.06
Tajikistan	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	116	2.59	1.02	2.65	3.59
Thailand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0.16	0.25	0.13	0.11
Trinidad Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.00
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	1.23	0.68	1.46	1.40
Turkey	0	0	2	0	2	3	1	4	0	7	3	2	1	5	3	3	0	4	7	5	3	3	0.07	0.00	0.13	0.06
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	62	1.39	0.00	0.93	2.69
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	9	5	0	4	7	13	9	10	3	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.17
United Arab E.	4	8	9	6	5	9	3	1	1	4	6	8	9	6	2	7	4	8	3	3	12	118	2.64	3.72	2.32	2.19
United Kingdom	16	12	18	11	17	12	17	15	7	14	18	22	33	25	9	17	20	14	16	12	13	338	7.55	8.71	8.89	5.66
United States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.07	0.00	0.07	0.11
Uruguay	2	3	5	3	5	1	5	2	1	2	3	3	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	0.78	2.03	0.73	0.00
USSR	0	2	1	0	6	1	1	2	1	1	4	3	2	5	0	0	2	1	3	2	2	7	0.16	0.00	0.27	0.17
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	39	0.87	0.93	1.19	0.56
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	3	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.17
Vietnam	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	0.08	0.00	0.00
Virgin Island	2	2	2	2	7	8	5	3	5	3	4	3	1								47	1.05	2.37	1.26	0.00	
Yugoslavia	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.07	0.08	0.00	0.11
Zimbabwe	80	170	195	188	218	184	147	141	129	128	205	254	339	312	190	174	215	299	320	250	336	4474	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not exist in that year.

Table 5: Investigating vs. targeted countries by level of development

Panel A: 1981-2001				
Targeted \ Investigating	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	1339 42.00%	1125 35.29%	724 22.71%	3188 100.00%
Developing Countries	422 34.79%	428 35.28%	363 29.93%	1213 100.00%
Countries in Transition	41 56.16%	8 10.96%	24 32.88%	73 100.00%
TOTAL	1802 40.28%	1561 34.89%	1111 24.83%	4474 100.00%

Panel B: 1981-1987				
Targeted \ Investigating	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	629 53.90%	282 24.16%	256 21.94%	1167 100.00%
Developing Countries	11 73.33%	4 26.67%	0 0.00%	15 100.00%
Countries in Transition	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	640 54.15%	286 24.20%	256 21.66%	1182 100.00%

Panel C: 1988-1994				
Targeted \ Investigating	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	428 39.05%	431 39.32%	237 21.62%	1096 100.00%
Developing Countries	145 37.37%	137 35.31%	106 27.32%	388 100.00%
Countries in Transition	24 100.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	24 100.00%
TOTAL	597 39.59%	568 37.67%	343 22.75%	1508 100.00%

Panel D: 1995-2001				
Targeted \ Investigating	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	282 30.49%	411 44.43%	232 25.08%	925 100.00%
Developing Countries	266 32.84%	287 35.43%	257 31.73%	810 100.00%
Countries in Transition	17 34.69%	8 16.33%	24 48.98%	49 100.00%
TOTAL	565 31.67%	706 39.57%	513 28.76%	1784 100.00%

Table 6: Investigated (vertical) vs. investigating (horizontal) countries

	Argentina	Australia	Austria	Brazil	Canada	Chile	China	Colombia	Costa Rica	Czech Rep.	Ecuador	EEC	Egypt	Finland	Guatemala	India	Indonesia	Israel	Jamaica	Japan	Lithuania	Malaysia	Mexico	New Zealand	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Poland	Russia	Singapore	Slovenia	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	Taiwan	Thailand	Trinidad Tobago	Turkey	Ukraine	USA	Uruguay	Venezuela	Total	Investigating Countries
Albania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Argentina	0	6	0	2	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	1	1	39	13
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Australia	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	0	26	11	
Austria	2	9	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	36	9	
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	
Bahrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
Bangladesh	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	
Belarus	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	8	
Belgium	2	21	0	0	13	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	69	11	
Bolivia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
Bosnia-Herzegov.	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
Brazil	43	24	0	0	19	4	0	0	0	0	0	21	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	45	0	188	13
Bulgaria	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	7
Canada	0	11	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	44	0	74	12
Chile	6	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	1	25	7
China	36	41	0	12	20	1	0	1	0	0	0	85	0	0	0	44	3	1	0	1	0	0	24	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	0	5	422	23
Colombia	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	13	6	
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3
Cote d'Ivoire	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Croatia	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	3
Cuba	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Cyprus	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Czech Rep.	4	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	6	
Czechoslovakia	0	8	4	2	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	59	9	
Denmark	0	3	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	10	
Dominican Rep.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
East Germany	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	38	6

Table 7: Outcome of AD investigations, 1981-2001

Country	Initiated	Measures		Measures	
		duty	undertak.	% of total	% undert./measures
Guatemala	1	1	0	100.00%	0.00%
Jamaica	1	1	0	100.00%	0.00%
Singapore	2	2	0	100.00%	0.00%
Spain	1	1	0	100.00%	0.00%
Thailand	7	6	0	85.71%	0.00%
EEC	784	343	235	73.72%	40.66%
India	192	138	0	71.88%	0.00%
Finland	16	2	9	68.75%	81.82%
Egypt	25	17	0	68.00%	0.00%
Malaysia	15	10	0	66.67%	0.00%
South Korea	66	26	17	65.15%	39.53%
Mexico	180	103	14	65.00%	11.97%
Venezuela	31	20	0	64.52%	0.00%
Philippines	19	12	0	63.16%	0.00%
United States	856	483	25	59.35%	4.92%
Canada	478	259	20	58.37%	7.17%
Colombia	27	15	0	55.56%	0.00%
Turkey	94	49	0	52.13%	0.00%
Indonesia	33	17	0	51.52%	0.00%
South Africa	230	118	0	51.30%	0.00%
Japan	10	2	3	50.00%	60.00%
Paraguay	2	1	0	50.00%	0.00%
Trinidad Tobago	8	3	1	50.00%	25.00%
Brazil	143	66	5	49.65%	7.04%
New Zealand	85	34	7	48.24%	17.07%
Israel	25	12	0	48.00%	0.00%
Argentina	201	81	10	45.27%	10.99%
Peru	36	15	0	41.67%	0.00%
Chile	17	7	0	41.18%	0.00%
Australia	829	277	63	41.01%	18.53%
China	22	9	0	40.91%	0.00%
Czech Republic	3	1	0	33.33%	0.00%
Nicaragua	3	0	1	33.33%	100.00%
Ukraine	3	1	0	33.33%	0.00%
Taiwan	73	14	6	27.40%	30.00%
Poland	28	6	1	25.00%	14.29%
Sweden	13	0	3	23.08%	100.00%
Costa Rica	6	1	0	16.67%	0.00%
Austria	9	0	0	0.00%	-
Ecuador	1	0	0	0.00%	-
Lithuania	14	0	0	0.00%	-
Panama	2	0	0	0.00%	-
Russia	2	0	0	0.00%	-
Slovenia	1	0	0	0.00%	-
Uruguay	3	0	0	0.00%	-
TOTAL	4597	2153	420	55.97%	16.32%

Table 8: Definitive measures by imposing country

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%
Argentina	0	0	8	21	12	13	12	11	14	91	3.54	0.00	0.00	7.87
Australia	25	34	49	39	18	25	3	6	12	6	6	35	24	20	3	1	2	7	14	4	7	340	13.24	26.69	15.84	3.28
Brazil	15	8	37	13	17	27	10	23	5	6	5	11	15	16	14	6	3	5	8	12	14	71	2.76	0.00	2.62	4.58
Canada	0	3	0	2	0	2	0	0	7	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.61
Chile	9	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.78
China	15	0.58	0.00	0.44	1.04
Colombia	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	3	4	3	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Costa Rica	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Czech Republic	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
EEC	19	31	49	35	31	23	29	16	25	22	25	20	26	19	22	31	15	43	32	28	37	578	22.51	30.01	22.24	17.98
Egypt	17	0.66	0.00	0.00	1.47
Finland	2	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	EEC	11	0.43	0.83	0.73	0.00	
Guatemala	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
India	138	5.37	0.00	0.73	11.50
Indonesia	17	0.66	0.00	0.00	1.47
Israel	12	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.04
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09	
Japan	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0.19	0.14	0.44	0.09
Malaysia	10	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.86
Mexico	112	4.36	0.00	6.25	5.96
New Zealand	.	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	6	1	0	7	9	0	1	3	3	1	0	0	3	41	1.60	0.14	4.22	0.95
Nicaragua	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Paraguay	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Peru	15	0.58	0.00	0.15	1.21
Philippines	12	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.04
Poland	7	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.61
Singapore	2	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.17
South Africa	118	4.60	0.00	2.18	8.90
South Korea	43	1.67	0.28	1.02	2.94
Spain	0	0	0	0	1	EEC	1	0.04	0.14	0.00	0.00
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	EEC	3	0.12	0.28	0.15	0.00	
Taiwan	20	0.78	0.14	1.45	0.78
Thailand	6	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.52
Trinidad Tobago	4	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.35
Turkey	49	1.91	0.00	4.36	1.64
Ukraine	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
United States	5	48	8	33	13	25	40	22	29	17	17	16	31	41	55	17	15	17	20	19	20	508	19.78	23.79	25.15	14.09
Venezuela	20	0.78	0.00	0.29	1.56
Total	66	121	145	120	81	100	90	76	85	59	78	120	134	136	143	128	115	163	208	197	203	2568	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not have an AD law in that year.

A dot means that no information is available for that year.

EEC means that the country joined the EEC in that year; from that year onward its investigations are included in the EEC data.

Table 9: Definitive measures in place by imposing country

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Argentina	0	0	9	28	32	37	42	45	45	238
Australia	78	104	159	192	167	171	109	49	19	20	20	44	64	85	86	86	56	49	48	48	56	1710
Brazil						0	0	0	4	4	6	8	15	18	18	20	23	23	35	42	52	268
Canada	123	159	152	155	132	152	150	159	143	103	71	71	81	83	91	96	95	75	77	88	89	2345
Chile						0	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	6
China											0	2	3	5	6	7	7	8	13	12	14	16
Colombia											0	2	3	5	6	7	7	8	13	12	14	77
Costa Rica											0	2	3	5	6	7	7	8	13	12	14	77
Czech Republic											0	2	3	5	6	7	7	8	13	12	14	77
EEC	55	73	83	124	146	123	119	100	170	151	143	157	185	157	157	171	157	162	183	190	219	3025
Egypt																	0	5	5	10	10	30
Finland	2	2	2	0	1	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	EEC							12
Guatemala																	1	1	1	2	1	6
India														5	5	13	19	32	61	91	121	347
Indonesia														5	5	13	19	32	61	91	121	347
Israel																	0	6	14	14	17	51
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	.	.	1	1	2	4	8	3	4	23
Japan	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	3	1	1	1	0	1
Malaysia	0	2	4	8	8	9	8	39
Mexico						0	3	0	3	11	15	24	26	27	42	61	100	89	88	80	66	632
New Zealand	.	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	12	11	7	14	24	23	22	26	26	27	21	13	11	244
Nicaragua															0	0	0	0	1	1	.	2
Paraguay																	0	0	0	1	1	2
Peru												0	0	1	1	2	6	7	7	14	15	53
Philippines															0	0	3	4	6	7	9	29
Poland																	0	0	1	1	7	9
Singapore						0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	12
South Africa										3	8	3	8	17	20	21	40	54	86	104	109	462
South Korea						0	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	4	6	8	21	23	28	27	29	158
Spain	0	0	0	0	1	1	EEC															2
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	EEC							7
Taiwan						0	0	1	2	2	2	4	5	11	8	9	9	9	11	13	12	99
Thailand														0	1	1	2	4	4	6	6	24
Trinidad Tobago														.	0	0	0	1	1	2	5	9
Turkey										0	14	23	25	27	38	38	37	35	34	13	15	299
Ukraine																				0	1	1
United States	85	83	92	104	112	122	151	167	198	196	209	236	279	306	305	307	305	322	336	300	241	4456
Venezuela										0	0	0	0	2	4	4	3	5	9	19	19	65
Total	343	421	490	576	559	570	538	489	552	499	488	588	720	773	824	906	956	994	1136	1161	1196	14779

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not have an AD law in that year.

A dot means that no information is available for that year.

EEC means that the country joined the EEC in that year; from that year onward its investigations are included in the EEC data.

Table 10: Imposing vs. targeted countries by level of development

Panel A: 1981-2001				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	733 40.30%	589 32.38%	497 27.32%	1819 100.00%
Developing Countries	228 33.93%	221 32.89%	223 33.18%	672 100.00%
Countries in Transition	7 38.89%	5 27.78%	6 33.33%	18 100.00%
TOTAL	968 38.58%	815 32.48%	726 28.94%	2509 100.00%

Panel B: 1981-1987				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	346 52.42%	140 21.21%	174 26.36%	660 100.00%
Developing Countries	1 33.33%	2 66.67%	0 0.00%	3 100.00%
Countries in Transition	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	347 52.34%	142 21.42%	174 26.24%	663 100.00%

Panel C: 1988-1994				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	219 38.83%	217 38.48%	128 22.70%	564 100.00%
Developing Countries	54 43.20%	35 28.00%	36 28.80%	125 100.00%
Countries in Transition	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	273 39.62%	252 36.57%	164 23.80%	689 100.00%

Panel D: 1995-2001				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	168 28.24%	232 38.99%	195 32.77%	595 100.00%
Developing Countries	173 31.80%	184 33.82%	187 34.38%	544 100.00%
Countries in Transition	7 38.89%	5 27.78%	6 33.33%	18 100.00%
TOTAL	348 30.08%	421 36.39%	388 33.54%	1157 100.00%

Table 11: Imposing undertakings vs. targeted countries by level of development

Panel A: 1981-2001				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	117 33.52%	60 17.19%	172 49.28%	349 100.00%
Developing Countries	30 54.55%	20 36.36%	5 9.09%	55 100.00%
Countries in Transition	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 100.00%
TOTAL	148 36.54%	80 19.75%	177 43.70%	405 100.00%

Panel B: 1981-1987				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	70 36.84%	20 10.53%	100 52.63%	190 100.00%
Developing Countries	1 33.33%	2 66.67%	0 0.00%	3 100.00%
Countries in Transition	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	71 36.79%	22 11.40%	100 51.81%	193 100.00%

Panel C: 1988-1994				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	26 31.71%	23 28.05%	33 40.24%	82 100.00%
Developing Countries	13 72.22%	4 22.22%	1 5.56%	18 100.00%
Countries in Transition	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	39 39.00%	27 27.00%	34 34.00%	100 100.00%

Panel D: 1995-2001				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	21 27.27%	17 22.08%	39 50.65%	77 100.00%
Developing Countries	16 47.06%	14 41.18%	4 11.76%	34 100.00%
Countries in Transition	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 100.00%
TOTAL	38 33.93%	31 27.68%	43 38.39%	112 100.00%

Table 12: Definitive measures by affected country

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.08	0.00	0.15	0.09
Argentina	0	1	0	2	1	4	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	18	0.72	1.21	0.58	0.52
Australia	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	2	13	0.52	0.30	0.44	0.69
Austria	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	1	1	12	0.48	0.75	0.15	0.52
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.08	0.00	0.29	0.00
Belarus	1	1	3	3	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	7	0.28	0.00	0.29	0.43
Belgium	1	1	3	3	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	2	4	1	1	27	1.08	1.51	1.16	0.78
Bosnia Herzeg.	1	1	8	4	4	5	5	5	1	4	2	7	6	9	6	13	12	4	6	7	4	114	4.55	4.22	4.94	4.49
Brazil	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	3	0	1	0	3	2	0	14	0.56	0.30	0.44	0.78
Bulgaria	0	8	2	3	4	4	4	3	3	2	0	2	3	3	0	2	0	2	3	0	0	48	1.91	3.77	2.33	0.61
Canada	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	0	1	8	0.32	0.30	0.00	0.52
Chile	1	1	6	11	6	5	6	3	2	3	17	16	14	20	33	31	22	34	21	14	26	292	11.64	5.43	10.90	15.64
China	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.12	0.15	0.00	0.17
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	7	0.28	0.00	0.29	0.43
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Cuba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	2	2	3	0	12	0.48	0.00	0.29	0.86
Czech Republic	0	6	5	4	4	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	28	1.12	3.47	0.73	0.00
Czechoslovakia	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	0.28	0.15	0.29	0.35
Denmark	1	5	5	4	4	3	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	28	1.12	3.77	0.44	0.00
East Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.08	0.15	0.00	0.09
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	16	0.64	0.00	0.00	1.38
EEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	6	0.24	0.00	0.29	0.35
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.17
Estonia	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0	0	1	1	3	2	0	16	0.64	0.60	0.73	0.61
Finland	1	4	10	4	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	4	2	0	3	2	7	6	6	62	2.47	3.47	1.89	2.25
France	3	3	8	6	2	2	1	6	4	2	2	4	4	5	4	4	2	6	7	5	5	85	3.39	3.77	3.92	2.85
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0.16	0.00	0.29	0.17
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	3	1	1	2	0	3	1	1	4	0	2	1	0	24	0.96	0.60	1.60	0.78
Hong Kong	0	3	2	1	2	2	3	0	1	0	1	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	3	3	1	28	1.12	1.96	1.02	0.69
Hungary	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.15	0.00	0.00
Iceland	0	1	2	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	4	4	4	4	3	2	8	8	11	7	62	2.47	0.90	1.89	3.72
India	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	1	3	7	4	6	10	41	1.63	0.00	1.45	2.68
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.17
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0.24	0.30	0.29	0.17
Ireland	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	8	0.32	0.75	0.15	0.17
Israel	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	8	0.32	0.75	0.15	0.17
Italy	1	2	3	7	4	2	3	0	3	1	0	4	1	3	3	1	3	3	7	2	2	55	2.19	3.32	1.74	1.82

Table 12: Definitive measures by affected country, continued

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%
Japan	3	18	14	17	10	13	14	12	13	10	11	10	6	9	9	6	5	6	11	13	14	224	8.93	13.42	10.32	5.53
Kazakhstan																						12	0.48	0.00	0.58	0.69
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.15	0.00	0.00
Kuwait	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.15	0.00
Kyrgyzstan													1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.15	0.00
Latvia												0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	2	5	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.43
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.15	0.00
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	3	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.26
Luxembourg	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.08	0.15	0.15	0.00
Macedonia													0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Malawi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
Malaysia	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	2	1	1	2	4	3	3	2	2	4	30	1.20	0.00	1.45	1.73
Mexico	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	0	3	1	2	1	4	3	1	1	5	1	1	6	2	35	1.40	0.60	2.03	1.47
Moldova												0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.26
Netherlands	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	4	0	24	0.96	0.75	1.45	0.78
New Zealand	0	0	3	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	14	0.56	1.51	0.15	0.26
Norway	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	7	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.17
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	5	0.20	0.00	0.29	0.26
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.17
Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	8	0.32	0.15	0.58	0.26
Poland	2	4	4	1	2	2	7	0	2	1	1	0	4	1	2	1	2	5	8	2	4	55	2.19	3.32	1.31	2.07
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	3	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.26	
Puerto Rico	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0.08	0.30	0.00	0.00
Romania	2	3	8	2	1	1	4	0	4	4	4	3	1	0	2	1	0	3	2	3	2	50	1.99	3.17	2.33	1.12
Russia												0	4	5	9	6	5	6	12	11	13	71	2.83	0.00	1.31	5.36
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	6	0.24	0.00	0.44	0.26
Serbia/Monten.													1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	0.12	0.00	0.15	0.17
Singapore	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	3	3	0	0	1	2	6	2	0	0	1	2	2	1	29	1.16	0.90	2.18	0.69
Slovak Republic													0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	4	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.35
Slovenia												0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.09
South Africa	0	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	2	3	2	3	3	5	0	28	1.12	0.75	0.73	1.56
South Korea	1	1	9	9	4	7	4	2	4	9	4	8	13	11	7	4	2	9	15	19	21	163	6.50	5.28	7.41	6.66
Spain	2	0	5	4	5	1	0	3	2	0	1	2	1	2	4	0	1	2	5	3	3	46	1.83	2.56	1.60	1.56
Sweden	1	0	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0	1	27	1.08	2.26	0.87	0.52
Switzerland	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0.20	0.45	0.15	0.09
Taiwan	0	2	2	6	1	5	6	2	7	3	5	7	7	4	3	4	4	9	12	11	11	111	4.43	3.32	5.09	4.67
Tajikistan												0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.00	0.15	0.00

Table 12: Definitive measures by affected country, continued

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%
Thailand	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	2	4	2	3	4	3	6	7	3	7	1	7	8	61	2.43	0.45	2.76	3.37
Trinidad Tobago	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.17
Turkey	0	1	2	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	3	2	0	0	2	2	2	2	4	2	28	1.12	1.06	1.02	1.21
Ukraine												0	3	4	8	2	3	3	8	10	6	47	1.87	0.00	1.02	3.46
United Kingdom	1	1	5	3	1	3	0	2	1	1	1	3	2	3	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	43	1.71	2.11	1.89	1.38
United States	14	7	17	10	9	5	3	5	8	1	7	11	15	13	9	7	9	7	14	9	11	191	7.62	9.80	8.72	5.70
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.08	0.00	0.15	0.09
USSR	3	3	5	1	2	1	4	3	1	1	0	0										24	0.96	2.87	0.73	0.00
Venezuela	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4	2	0	4	7	0	1	0	0	1	26	1.04	0.45	1.45	1.12
Vietnam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.26
Virgin Island	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04	0.15	0.00	0.00
Yugoslavia	0	2	2	1	1	4	3	2	3	4	3	0	0									25	1.00	1.96	1.74	0.00
Zimbabwe	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	0.08	0.15	0.00	0.09
Total	41	87	144	120	81	100	90	71	89	60	78	120	134	136	143	128	115	165	206	197	203	2508	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not exist in that year.

Table 13: Affected (vertical) vs. imposing (horizontal) countries for definitive measures, continued

	Argentina	Australia	Brazil	Canada	Chile	China	Colombia	Costa Rica	Czech Rep.	Egypt	EBC	Finland	Guatemala	India	Indonesia	Israel	Jamaica	Japan	Malaysia	Mexico	New Zealand	Nicaragua	Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Poland	Singapore	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	Taiwan	Thailand	Trinidad Tobago	Turkey	Ukraine	USA	Venezuela	Total	Investigating Countries				
India	1	3	5	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	10	0	62	13					
Indonesia	0	7	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	5	0	41	11						
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	1			
Ireland	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	2	6	2		
Israel	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	8	4	8	4		
Italy	2	12	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	22	1	22	1	55	10	55	10			
Japan	2	27	1	19	0	2	0	0	0	3	47	1	0	11	1	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	9	0	1	5	0	0	0	84	3	84	3	224	18	224	18			
Kazakhstan	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	3	2	12	7	12	7				
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1				
Kuwait	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1		
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1			
Latvia	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	5	4	5	4		
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	3	1
Luxembourg	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	1
Macedonia	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Malawi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Malaysia	0	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	0	4	0	30	10	30	10		
Mexico	2	3	3	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	9	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	11	0	11	0	35	10	35	10		
Moldova	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	3	3	3			
Netherlands	0	6	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	4	0	4	0	4	0	24	10	24	10			
New Zealand	0	9	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	14	5	14	5		
Norway	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	7	3	7	3			
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	5	4	
Paraguay	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	1		
Philippines	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	8	5	8	5			
Poland	2	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	55	12	55	12			
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3		
Puerto Rico	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	1		
Romania	0	1	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	25	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	6	0	50	9	50	9	
Russia	2	1	3	3	2	1	4	0	0	0	19	0	0	8	2	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	7	2	7	2	71	20	71	20			

Figure 1: Countries with AD law and GATT/WTO membership




Figure 2: Countries with AD law




Figure 3: AD investigations initiated




Figure 4: AD measures in force by groups of countries

